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~HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
Do we learn to reason logically just as we learn grammar or estimating 
distances ? Philosophers usually say we do and have taught logic as a discipline 
for thousands of years. They are generally not content to teach "about" logic, 
or in the history of it; they generally state their intent is to teach "logic for 
everyday thinking". Appendix VI is a personal communication to the author from 
a philosopher stating this clearly and comparing the skill of logical reasoning 
with the skill of using grammar. 
Or is logical reasoning a relatively inherent trait, as intelligence is 
generally assumed to be? We all have the subtle feeling that son,e are more 
logical than others and usually make this judgment without knowledge of who has 
been educated in logic. One group of ptiyoholcgists went so far {31) as to call a 
reasoning test a "status-free test of intelligence" apparently assuming not only 
that logic is innate but is also virtutilly the whole of innate mental abUity. 
An examination of the psychological literature on logical reasoning starts 
with the work done in the development of reasoning in childhood, thus far the best 
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investigated branch of the field. So in the question of whether logic is best to be 
considered learned or innate, we turn first to the evidence from developmental 
studies. 
A. Development of reasoning. 
In 1928 Piaget's JUDGMENT AND BEASONlli"G IN THE CHILD (60) noted that 
there appears to be an orderly development of reasoning ability through childhood 
to about the twelfth year. This could suggest the possibility that logic is an in-
herent trait although 1t does not prove it. Piaget's pioneering observations led to 
further investigation. 
Smedslund (67) gave a logic problem to forty children 5 to 7 years old. The 
problem was: Jack prefers Apples to Bananas. 
He also prefers Bananas to Chewing gum. 
Does Jack prefer Apples or Chewing gum? 
Although this simple syllogism is probably the most primitive transitive inference, 
Smedslund found an almost total absence of ability to make the deduction. The 
children were influenced by their own preferences or other irrelevant factors. 
Furthermore. the subjects' own preferences were often not transitive, i.e., they 
might prefer A to B, and B to C, but C over A! 
Related to this study is one by Morino-Abbele (51) with nine children the 
same age as Smedsllmd's. She set up a game situation requiring certain simple 
arithmetic inferences to ''win". Although the children had never been taught the 
concept needed,. after a period of unorganized attempts and "a sense of discovery" 
children invariably derived the needed conclusions. 
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Glanz {16) noted that transductive reasoning, which is essentially non-
logical, prevails at kindergarten age but that some signs of deductive and in-
ductive thinking are also present. These would presumably be the result of in-
dividual differences. In similar work Denner (11) noted that the development of 
thought processes from transductive before school to "reasoning" present by 
the 4th grade. Gan'kova (15) reported reasoning present by the first grade, but 
more importantly he found the lack of a one-to-one relationship between age and 
thinking sta.;se. Since each year of life at these early ages represents quite a bit 
of 1naturat1on, his results suggest that reasoning is at least partly influenced by 
1 earning e:xperiences. 
Peachee (58) administered a ten-item deductive reasoning test to 140 school 
children, 20 in each age group five through eleven. He also gave an inductive 
reasoning test, the Similarities subscale from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children. Intelligence was roughly controlled by using only children judged "average" 
by their teachers. He found an almost straight line function between age and de-
ductive reasoning ability, but interestingly did not find such a function for the in-
ductive test. There are two design flaws in his study; age groups were taken from 
different neighborhoods (7 age groups, 7 parochial schools); and he compared group 
means by a series of t-tests (increasing the possibility of significance), but the 
regularity of his graphed results tends to lend credence to his results. (See figure 
1) Generally, his results show an orderly increase in deductive ability in the absence 
of direct deductive training. 
high 
TEST 
SCORES 
low 
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Figure 1. Grnphed results of the Peachee study (58) showing the 
regularity of. the sco1~e distributions for both the deductive (SYLLOGISMS) 
and the inductive (SIMILARITIES) tests. 
Kostik (30) gave high school students a logic test with deductive items con-
cerning "science" and "home economics". The two types of items were balanced, 
as his intent was to compare the sexes. Intelli~--ence, previous knowledge of lor,r:ic, 
reading ability, practice effect, and certain personality traits were hold constant. 
There was a sex difference and the author concludos ''boys' superior ability". 
This is an important study from tho viewpoint of whether logical reasoning is 
inherent, for if one sex 1s superior without differential training it strongly suggests 
a leurned cultural difference, which rules heavily in favor of logic as acquired. 
On the other hand, when i'lllller (43) compared high school students who had 
received instruction in reasoning with those who had not, controlling for grade, 
scholastic training and standing, mental age, reading ability, and~. he found 
none of these factors related to ability on a logical fallacies test. He did find a 
difference between the trained and untrained groups. So although his results differ 
from Kostllt's in sex, his do suggest that logic is acri'Uired. 
Kostik's results in regard to sox differences ara difficult to understand • 
.Biella.uskas (4), Peacb.ee (58), and Piagot (60) found no sox difference prior to 
Koatik 's work, and no researcher since has foond such a difference. It 1a possible 
that the form or type of problems inadvertently favored the boys but this can not 
now be disce1'11.ed. 
These studies in the £ evelopment of reasoning ability, and others by Burt (6), 
and Noelti:ng (56), show a regular and orderly increase in deductive skill with age 
in children. Those by Morino-Abele nnd :Miller g-o further in showing an influence 
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by training. and the Kostilt study goes furtherlst in proposing the influence of a 
cultural difference. 'fha evidence for inductive reasoning in not as clear, but 
similar. 
The studies from child development ar:e suggestive but not conclusive. As 
Wechsler points out (83) intelligence, usunlly assumed innate, ia incroasing in 
a regular order at the same time logic ability is risil.lg. A study that would como 
more directly to the point would be a comparison of logic ability with. say, mental 
age, rather than chronological age. If logic ability progresses independently of 
mental age it could be said to be influenced by learning. No such study had been 
done by 1959. 
B. Influences showing an effect on reasoning. 
The question of development unsettled, the next reasonable quest would be 
for environmental influences on reasoning ability. If temporary. lately acquired, 
or relatively subtle influences are shown to affect reasoning skills, it would tend to 
suggest that reasoning is acquired. But if logical reasoning is in.nate, it should be 
relatively free of environmental stimuli. In fact. much evidence has been advanced 
purporting to show tho effects of various environmental factors. For convenience 
in a.-wntnations, these factors a1·a here divided into throo categories: "atmosphere 
effect", effect of pathology, and physical effoct. 
1. Atmosphere effect. 'rb.e first study of this nature is by Th.rondike in 
1922 (77). He reported that changing the content of syllogisms from "neutral" to 
nenwtionally toned" caused the number of logical errors to increase. He had no 
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control g-rwp and made no statistical comparison. In 1928 · Vlilkins (85) did a 
simllar study with similar results. 
In 1936 Woodworth and Sells (87) said that an even subtler influence caused 
logical1naccurac'J. They showed that syllogisms in which the premises contained 
negative terms (e. g. , "No applies are blue" and 11This object is not an apple'') 
tended to give a negative atmosphere to the whole syllogism influencing subjects 
to give a negative conclusion ("This object is not blue") even when invalid. Salls 
said further th...'lt this effect holds even when the items are e.xpressed totally aym-
bolically (A' ~ B), named it uuw atmosphere effect" and began to generalize widely 
into personnlity theory and advertising (65). 
Further studies concerning the atmosphere effect seemed to corroborate 
Sells' principle. In 1943 Janis and Frick (26) r~ortcd that attitudes toward the 
TRUTH of conclusions in reality tendc<l to caufa errors in deciding on ti1e logical 
VALIDITY of them. In 19fl.A Morgan nnd 1\·lorton (50) aaid syllogisms were often 
incorrectly solved when personal convictions were related to the content mn.ter1al. 
In 1946 Lefford (32) published the moat careful study of the atmosphere effect 
up to thnt time adding the control gToup former eJq>erirnenters had neglected. His 
syllogisms test was composod of 20 "emotional" items antl 20 "non-emotional" 
iten1s, emotionality defined by content of the items.* G1·aphing number of error-6 
with number of items, he shows tl1.1.t the non-emotional items' errors fell into a 
* In umHRlclly conncicntious reporting, Lafford published his entire logic teot, 
makillf~ it possible to describe the nemotional content" of his items. The "emotional" 
items are characterized by proper nouns and current events from the news; tha 
"non-emotional" items utilized common nouns and definitions from academic eubjects. 
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J-cul~vc, indicating th::tt :nwst of tho subjects rnissed larg-s ruunbcrs of tho en1o-
tion.."ll items. Le!ford takes th!B aa e"~riuence of the effect of emotionality on logical 
reasoning. If his re.sults could be taken as valid, it would constitute the sh·ongeat 
evidence for the ai.Tnosphorc effect. He did not statistical analysis, noting that 
:none was avnilable for that t·ypa of data in l94G. 
By 1V3G the atmosphe1.·o effect was virtually tot.."llly accepted by psychologists, 
rcceiv.i!Lz favorable rnention ill such standard texts as Undorv,rood's EXP.ER!l\1ENTAL 
P'.3YCHOLOGY (79), V/oodworth and Schlossbe1·g's EXPZRIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(GG), and Stevens' HANDBOOK OF EXP:CRIMBNTAJ ... PtJYCHOLOGY (·'14). In 1957 
Richter (62) felt that the effect wns clearly enough established to propose tr .... -·lt hence-
forth any teste purporting to ma'lsure logical reusoning ability should ask subjects 
for both VALIDITY and TRUTH judgnHmta. Then, if a subject's 'fRUTH decisions 
arc good while his V ALIDI'I'Y choices are poor, ho cm1 bo said to fail to grasp lOCi.cnl 
principles. If there is poor judgment on both TRUTH anrl VALIDITY. it would indi-
cntc he is under tho influence of tho atmosphere effect. If both T.HUTH nnd VALIDITY 
are gwd, he is raasoni.'l[; clearly and logicnlly. * 
Richte1· clafmificJ four types of errors in sylloJif:tlc tests: 
(1) careless ma.rldug or non .. coopern.tioM 
(2) inability to gTUSp concept.q 
* Vv1mt wruld Richter have said about good VALIDITY and poor TRUTH? I~ 
could have attributed it to mcntnl patholo:zy, but Arlcti (1) would disagree. Per-
haps it is the caso of the creative non-conformist whose historical position is to 
change items of accepted TRUTH by demonstrating- non-VALIDITY. 
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(3) failure to differentiate TRUTH and VALIDITY 
(:::) impnirr.:H.:mt in chwsification. 
Pl"ior to his p1·opoood the 1nethod the 2nd and 3rd typos of errors were not c'!istin-
g;uishable~ lack af logical reasoning nbflity and the untmosphere effect" were 
confounded. 
One other study should be added to those categorized with the atmosphere 
effect. In la53 Shaklce (GO) used n. log,ical reasoniruJ problem as a criterion in 
a study concerning lcarninz theory. He allowed subjects sundry types of related 
practice prior to attending to the criterion problem. Those who had severnl short 
rest periods during practice (distributed practice) were superior on the problem to 
those who had one long root period~(mnsscd/spilcod practice) nnd both of these 
groups wore superior to one that had no reat per::.od (massed practice). If an en-
vironmental .factor as subtle as type of practice hflucnce reasoning performance, 
this would be the moat suggestive of the "atmosphere" studies. However, before 
accepting Shaldee's results as demonstrating this, it is necessary to take into ac-
count hia comment that "high solvers., did not differ in their performance l*Cgardless 
of the type of prnctice. 
2. Effect of mental pnthoio;;:y. If logical reasoning is L."'lUato, mental pathology 
itself should not change a schizophrenic's laws of logic. His premises might be 
ban~:Xl on facts not accepta.":>le to others, making his conclusio!lf'l bize.rre, but his 
. 
roasonin:; need not be invalid. If on the other hand logic is acquired along ·with 
grammar and estimation of distances, tho laws of logic would be subject to ch.1mge 
with acquired pathology. 
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Exactly this contention, tr .... 'it the mental patient operates under a differer..t 
logic, was introduced in this country in 1044 by Von Domarus (82). He cln.irned 
that observatiou.a of schizophrenics l"evealed that the-y operate with a cUfferent Get 
of logical laws th.'Ul the generally accepted four APistotclian princ:lplea. * 8pecifioa.Uy 
he noted that tl1c schizoid personality is not bound by the ln.vr of the o'~ludcd middle. 
The fallacy of the unexcluded rni!ldle allows a conclusion linking subjects in identity 
on the basis ol a common predicate. For e:mmplo: 
Napoleon, a power.ful n1an, was short of stature. 
I am short of stature. 
Therefore, I arn .Napoleon, a powerful n1an1 
Accepting the fallacy of tlle unexcluucd middle can lead to some L.'lteresting 
conclusions. In one exe.J..Y;ple by Arieti (1) a patient rcaconcd: 
(The h~1.d of) Jesus is encircled (by a hclo of radiance). 
A woman is encircled (by tue vulgar smmal Q:lance). 
Therefore, Jesus :ic a \vomn..."l. 
Having proven this, it was no trick at all to show that a. wom::m is a c4,rar, 
in as much as cigars are circled by bnnds. In this e:<ample, Aricti points out, 
* Arieti (1) sru11marizes the four Aristotelian principles: (a) lmy__?f identity, 
A ia ahvays A P.nd never something else; (b) law oi contrnd~. A cannot 
be A and something else; (c) law of the excluded middle, A is either A or not 
A; and (d) law of suffici~1t reason. 
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the TRUTH of the pl'emises is reasonably acceptable nnd only a failure in logic 
ac.,-ccunts for the co1wlusions lacking TRUTH.* 
The observation thnt schizophrenics commonly commit the :!allacy of the 
unexcluded (or undistrlbu.ted) middle is called the Von Domarus principle. 
Having satisfied hl:msalf that schizoid thought does inrtood present tho Von-
Domarus prlnclple, Arietl e:q;1anded the meaning of tho principle. First defining 
the logic system tlmt allfJWS the unillstributed middle as the "paleolog1c", he re-
states tha Von Domarus principle: 't'\Vhereas the normal person accepts identity 
only on the basis of identicnl subjects, the paleologician accepts identity based 
on ide11tical predlcateatt. Arleti goes much further thnn Von Domarus' obser.ration, 
hmvever; he stateD that the pa.leologic was the co:r:;nnon form of reasoning pl'ior to 
Aristotle and is still prevalent in primitive cultures. For example: 
J-..Iy enerny possessed this hair lcUld these fingernail sbJ:etls. 
This magic doll now haD this hair and these fint{ernails. 
Therefore, harm committed on this doll will befall my enemy. 
Arieti also proposes that children are paleologiclans before they mature into 
Aristotelian logic: 
I o;m nt this cnndy counter i.'l this store. 
* It should he pointed out that the patient did not cort.struct the syllogism. 
He confined himself to observing that Jesus is a vroman nnd adding that a wonmn 
is junt like a good cigar. Arieti assumed the reasoning process given here. 
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Thls lollipop is at this coonter. 
So, this lollipop is now mine. 
lVIythology too, he snys is based on the paloolor;ic: 
Cassandra spooF..s prophecies such as no mortals speak. 
Tho gods .speak prophecies such as no mortals speak. 
Cassandra spool:s the prophecies of gods. 
Arieti presumes dreams are based on the paleologic: 
My wife is a youug, light-hnired woman. 
This person I am strangling is a young, light-haired woman. 
Therefore, I am (in this dream) strangling my wife! 
Superstitions are examples of tho paleologic: 
I delayed in drood looking at my ca.:rds last time and got n. good hand. 
This time aloo I need a good hand. 
So, if I juat slowly ease these cards apart ••• 
Arieti says we intentionally employ the paleologic in order to create or 
enjoys humor. (ttSince arl'ivinz in lvloscow, I find Ruscian is a very gu.ttrallang-
uage. This morning I belched at breakfast and the pretty waitress slapped me! 
-Bob Hope) 
Indeed Arieti clai:r:t:s that the Freudiun interpretation of dreams, SC}.Ual 
symbolism, the "whole Freudian technic" is based on the fact that the su.bconsciou.s 
of each of us utilizes the paleologic. If Aristotelian loGic is, as Arieti theorizes, 
limited to tho normal, at'Vlt, awake, civilized, objective, serious person, then 
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logic must surely be n.cquireu, acquired since Aristotle, and rather tencously 
maintained. 
It is not nocooaary to accapt Ariet.i'a contentions on the basis of his ru:·;;"U-
menta. Actually it should.!!!?! be accepted upon his argument, which contains a 
logical fallacy (that primitives, children, dreamers, etc. are linl;eu in identity 
by the common predicate of the fullacy of the undistributed m.iddle)*. Every one 
of h.iB e:mrnplas could be just ao easily accOI.tnted for by assuming the reasoning is 
VALID bu.t that the prerdses upon which it is based nrG not necessarily TRUE. The 
actual test of hla theory is an empiric one, do schizophrenics actuo.lly commit the 
fallacy whereas normals do not? No such test had been made by W58. 
3. ~sicnl effe.ct. If reasoning ability is innnto, logic should not show 
deterioration under stress. When tho phyoicnl stimuli aro sufficient to dhninish 
motivation for tho task, or to directly interfere in the performance of it. of course 
reasoning would be less e:!ficicntly e~vressed, but no change in the manner of the 
logical process itself would be e~~pected. No experiments have been done directly 
on the question, but a few haven suggestive rolntion. 
:r•,laa.g (~;3) developed n. roason1.'1g- tent to measure tl(,'Crement 1n performance 
with the laclc (lf m;:yt;Jn, for rHilitary application. He \va::; successful in thu1, surr-
~asting tb.£1.t reasoning pcrlorr..:anco is :more sensitive to hypoxia than n.re physical 
* Intoresting;ly, .his fallacy is the fallacy of the undistributed middle. 
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measures. A suggestion by the author, however, that tho teat be u~.<ed in other 
stress situations indicates that the e:xperimenter apparently felt the performance 
VIM affected by the stress in hy-poxia, rather than that there is a direct relation-
ship betv1een acquired reasoning and envirorunontal stimuli. 
Phillip (59) found that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25) distorted thought 
processes, but he didn't clarify whether laws of logic were modified or whether 
hallucinations added g-ratuitous data for premises. 
Hurst (25) noted that 5 non-schizophrenic patients who ordinarily dld not ex-
hibit thought disorder did so when under the influence of intravenous a.n1ylobarbitcm.e 
solution. His interest was in demonstrating that schizq:threnic patients should not 
be interviewed under influence of this drug lest flase diagnoses be m·awn, and he 
did not clarify whether tho thought disorder waa UiVALTIJ logic or UNTRUE promises. 
Ovet·a.U, Brown, a."ld Gel'l..try (57) b·ained 33 rhesus monlteys in intermediate 
size discrimination and then subjected them to 5 levels of radiation dosage. A test 
of transposition was employed to determine the extent of utilizing relationships 
between stimuli for solution of this animal deductive problem. Relational learning 
wna foond to decrease as a linear function of radiation increase. If one is willing to 
generalize unreservedly from rhesus monke-.fS to humans in deductive reasoning, 
the results suggest logic is acquired. The main reoorvation iu auch a generaliza-
tion here is that an animal's c:L.proosion of the solution to a problem is physical 
(not verbal) and is thus handicapped to some dcgToe by the ra.diation dosage. R is 
not possible to distinguish between the reasoning proce:Js aud the efficiency of the 
responses from which the process is inferred. 
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A unique study of this nature is one by Nelson and Noely (53), who traiu.ad 
r-1icc to select the correct runway for reward by solviP..g a modification of lV'Jaier's 
rcanoning npparatus, unacceptable deductive problem for ani:mnls. 'fhey offered 
a. pulaating magnetic field "18,000 times the earth's magnetic field" in intensity, as 
a cue to assist tho animals L"l drawing the proper conclu.-3ion. It had no effect on 
thoh· rect.Soning, apparently, fo1~ it didn't aid their performance. 
Gordon and 'l'ikofslcy (18) tested 40 brain-injured patients on o. rea.aoning test 
involving both deductive a.~ inductive stc..:rps* and analyzed the scores. l'hey divided 
performance into three fn.ctors: spatial perception. Gestalt flexibility, and reason-
ing ability. If brain injury is assruned to interference with acquired skills, tho 
best that can be dra:wn from this is that at least some bl·ain-injured patients can 
continue to reason. 
In general, the few studios touching Upon reasoning undor various physical 
stimuli add little to tho question of the nntu1·e of lor:,1cal reasoning ability. Of 
course none of them wore undertakon with that intent. but such a study could be 
done relatively simply by steadily increasing a performance degrading atimulus 
and noting whether tho decrement is due to logical fallacies or to deterioration of 
motivation, perception, or some othor such factor. No such study had been done 
by 1058. 
* The Gottschnldt Embedded Fig'Ures Test. 
B. J;'actor analysis of reaJl<».lill~. 
In the 1950's while the possibility of :making comparisons of every possible 
correlation between different factors was highly popular, it was natural that 
reasoning ability should attract some of this attention. If logical reasoning skills 
could be broken down into component!;, it should bom~ heavily on the question of 
whether the skill is to be considered acquired or innate. Specifically, if it were 
composed of other sldlls, such aa intelligence, perceptual acuity, reading skills, 
and so forth, the evidence for loglc as lool"D.ed would be etr·ong. On the other hand 
if separo.tion into factors, while pooling off rclated skills failed to separate the 
core factor of reasouing, that core factor might be cnnsldered innate. 
The first review of fa.otor analytic studies of reasoning was by Marron in 
1953 (34). Comparing factor analyses to that date, he reported that agreement 
could be reached that five factors were involved: I. Sequential induction, n. Con-
crete analytic induction, m. Abstract analytic induction, IV. Sequential deduction, 
and V. Complex deduction. '.f'nis added nothing to the subject that would not emerge 
from a casual conversation with a logic instructor. But it is seen from the titles 
of the studies that :Marron had at his disposal before l9G3 th..1.t factorial studies had 
not yet seriously stutlied logical reasoning. 
In 1953 Howie (24) nnalyzed the results of 13 reasonin~ tests, intercorrelated 
scores, and factored separately for the two sexes. He also worked with two types 
of scores, number right, and number wrong in timed testa. For both sexes and both 
types of scores I1e found, among other factors, a "general rGasoning" factor. In the 
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crrot·s/timed an.-:1lysis he found also a uniqu.c factor he tontn.tlvoly called 
"cnutionn • 
. Also 1..."11953 Groen et nl. (lfl) reported an analysis of tho scores of :12 
tests administered to 283 £:ubjccts. Besides isolatin~..; foul~ related factors 
(verbal con1prchension, numerical facility, pe1·c~tual speed, nnd visualiza-
tion) they reported several reasoning factors, t\vo of which they en .led "g-eneral 
reasoning" and '!J.ogical reasoning". T!J.ey counted 11symbol substitution" as a 
reasoning factor, too. other reasoning factors they apparently believed wore 
acquired, for they narned then1, "education of perceptual relations", "education 
of con.ceptual relatioMn, and "education of corrclates 11• l:"'or the purposes of the 
pruscnt e:-~"Ul:.ination it J.s ger:r~m1e to note that after stripping off non-reasoning 
a."ld acc.tttired reasonLl\g factore they wet·o lelt with two relatively ''pure" factors. 
Factorial studies continued (2'7, :::5) at"'1d in 1D5,1 Guilford et al. (.ZO) reported 
the results or a. factor anclytic study of Navy roosonin[; tests n.nd the Air Force 
Aircrew Classification Battery. Frm:n 32 experimental tet:Jts for the Navy and 22 
si.o'Uldard Air FoTce to.sts they extracted 10 factors. 1\vchre were non-rea.Eoning 
factors a.."ld three were considerod ac.quircd rcasonhtr; skills (education of corre-
lates, education of perceptual relations, and cch.ICntion of conceptual relations). 
Tu.ey also were reduced to a basic factor they elected to n.."ll>lC "general reasoning." 
Also in 1954 nla.tin and AcTid.tiS (S6) published a second-order factor analysis 
of rc.a.soning abilities, and named five factors: precision in formntion and use of 
verbvJ concepts, general verbal fluency, v15ualizing spatial constancy during 
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movement, spoed in ru:mlysis, and flexibility in unruysis. Vlhlle it appears the 
l:.tttor fool~ are not basic reasoninr; ability, tbe first r ... my be open to sttch inter-
pretation. It is possible to ineist th.nt what tho authors -rnc:mt by t'precision in 
formation and use of vet·bal concepts" is essentially what is meant by lor;ical 
reasoning itseif and cO" .. lld conceivably be used v..s a definition for loi:-?.cal skill. 
In 1956 Kettner et al. (2B) v.ttempted to go deeper into tho matter by a 
f.'1.Ctor an...'llysis of tho factor formerly extracted and named, "ganervJ reasoning". 
From a battery of 23 tests, they extracted and nar.c:ou again several non-reasoning 
factors (verbal comprohonsion, numerical facility, visualization, ec'lucation of 
patterns, hnnclling complicatod procedurcr;, trial nnd error manipulation, and 
math achievement). In addition, they identific.>d two factors as ''logical evalur~ion" 
and ngoneral rea.'?Oni.."1gtr. In nttor~1ptil1g to C}{})lain why they nnn1ed this factor within 
the factor "gcueral reasoo.L."1g11 also ngeneral reasoning", they appear to be describ-
ing the skill of dcflning problClJJS. 
Frick et al. (13) also atten;.pting to deal more specifically with a formerly 
extractod factor. broke down "fJ.e.xibility in rcnso!lin;;-;" lnto "ve·rbat comprehension, 
originality, hleationn! fluency," and nr;ain, "logical evaluation" and "general 
reasoning' 1• 
Ill W5G Guilford, Kettner, cmd Christennen (21) attempted to C}tplain what 
factorial studies hrul yielded aboat tho nature of th-a gcneml reasonin!?; factor • 
. Apparently it is an unbrC<ikable factor. They feel th"'l.t it c::m best be thought of 
as "the comprehending and structuring of problems in prq)nration for handling 
them''. Tllis final summary does not arwwer the question of whether lor.rlcal ability 
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is to be considered innate or learned. That successive analyses fulled to break 
up a general reasoning factor Is encouraging to the viewpoint of innateness. On 
the other hand, when the authors describe it as the preparing of problems for handl-
ing, it appears certain that the logic professor will contend that this is exactly the 
core content of his course. The issue remains at this point, nothing having been 
added from factor analysis since 1956. 
* * * 
Having examined the evidence up to about W58, at that point the question of the 
nature of logical reasoning ability was dominated by Piaget and his students' sugges-
tion from developmental studies that logical reasoning is learned as a child, by 
Richter's contention that logical reasoning is subject to various atmosphere effects, 
by Arleti's application of the Von Domarus principle, and by Guilford's summary of 
factorial studies. 
At that point the evidence was strongly for logic as learned, and learned largely 
outside the logic classroom. By that time testers were bold enough to propose tests 
that purported to measure reasoning ability. NcNemar (41) and Lefford (32) produced 
tests for experimental purposes, Wechsler (83) purported to include a reasoning 
measure in a larger test, and others such as Hertzka and Guilford (23), Morgan and 
Morgan (49), Burt (6), and Lowry (31) put tests on the market. 
By 1956 also, the conclusions from the several lines of research here exa.:mlned 
had been generally accepted in psychology and were being presented to students. An 
example is Ruch (63) who in the 1963 edition of an introductory text presented all the 
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conclusions of 1956. He starts by telling the readers that syllogisms are not limited 
to "the highly trained thinker" having been learned in everydAy experience as per 
Piaget. He goes on to ad\tiae the use of "formal logic" to check opinions implicitly 
accq>ting Richter's rapresenta.tion of the atmosphere effect in opinion forming. He 
then goes on to devote half a page to a proposed aid to setting up problems to be 
solved diagramatically, as Guilford would recommend. Putting his whole discussion 
in a section of the textbook designed to help the student aid hilnself suggests that 
Ruch agrees with Arieti that logical fallacies are not normal. And in his presumption 
that half a page of logic instruction in a psychology text could change logical reasoning 
ability, he clearly reveals that he accepts the skill as an acquired one. 
Ruch probably represents the present state of the field in psychology, given the 
normal lng in publication and teaching. However, the frontier of the topic has changed 
considerably since 1959, and none of Ruch's assumptions can be unequivocally accepted 
now. Six studies published since 1959 that have inverted the status of the issue will 
now be examined. 
The so-called "atmosphere effect" was carefully re-examined by Chapn1nn and 
Chapman (8) who published their results in the Journal of Experimental Psychology :in 
1959. They noted tha.t all the atmosphere studies since Sells suffered from a serious 
flaw; all results were based on errors made by subjects who also got other items 
correct. No account was taken in any analysis of the items correctly decided, and 
in fact little account was taken of subjects who got nec*l.rly all items correct. Subjects 
who got all items correct. prior to Chapman and Chapman, never contributed anything 
to tabulations in research on the matter of logical reasoning ability. 
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Chapman and Chapman constntcted a syllogisms test of "negative" and 'positive" 
and also 'particular" and "universal" premises. SJ.lbjects made a multiple choice of 
the logical conclusion to be drawn from each syllogism, but B2 choice 1:!!! actually 
valid. 'featees had to commit a logical fallacy on every item, and under theso cir-
cumstances it could easily be determined which, if any. type of error is preferred 
without trusting to chance that the students who commit the most errors commit them 
in proportion to those who commit fETW. They did indeed find preferred errors, but 
they were of neither the ttnegaUve" or "particular" atmosphere effects. They found 
the most common error, in fact the overwhelming tendency, to be the "fallacy of the 
undistributed middle" among their 222 college students. 
'fhe authors point out that their results strongly disagree with the "atmosphc1·e 
effect" popular so long. The possibility exists that students who miss more items 
prefar the type of items that suggest an atmosphere effect. In additions, Chapman 
and Chapman (8) state: 
"Von Doma.rus and mora recently Arteti suggested that 1n 
syllogistic reasoning concluding two things are the same because 
they share a common quality is distinctively pathological~ They 
say this error is fwnd in schizophrenics, but not in normals. 
Clearly. our results contradict their suggestion. 11 • 
Chapman and Chapman were willing to speculate on the appeal of the fallacy 
of the unexcluded middle to reas()ners. They noted that it ris'es whenever a subject 
takes the converse of a universal statement. F'or inst.ance, when the universal 
premise, "All A are B" is given, people tend to accept its converse, "All Bare A", 
which is a logical fallacy. The authors note that this is genorally acceptable in 
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reality (e. g., All right angles are 90° angles, and all 90° angles are right angles) 
for ordinary purposes, although it is not acceptable in deductive reasoning. Accept-
ing the converse of "particular" statements is more risky in everyday life (l'.-tost 
executives are Republicans; Most Republicans are executives), and the students did 
]!2t tend to accept the converse of particular statements. 
So essentially, although Chapman and Chapman did not state it this way, what 
happened was that when problems were unsolvable, the students reverted to their 
everyday TRUTH system. It seems reasonable to make a certain inference from 
their study, although they did not specifically compare nneutra1'1 and "emotional" 
items. When Lefford did so and limited his results to an analysis of errors, he anal-
yzed only those instances in which his subjects were forced to revert to their TRUTH 
systems, and naturally found a relationship between problem answers and personal 
convictions. Conspicuously missing from his analysis were those answers the sub-
jects correctly· got VALID, although contradictory to then· TRUTH beliefs. 
An interesting implication of the doubts the Chapman and Chapman study raises 
about the "~tmosphere effect" nnd the "Von Domants principle" is that possibly in 
those studies where the mora logical subjects' results wo1·e systematically excluded 
from the tabulations, the results of inherently less logical subjects were used to demon-
strate that no one is inl1e1•ently logical. With this possibility in mind it is illuminating 
to refer back to the Shaklee (66) study. When he reported that the types of practice 
had an effect on reasoning performance, he also noted that it did not affect "high 
solvers". 
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In this llght also, two other studies n.uat be dismissed. Gaier, Lee, and 
McQuitty (14) Gl.ve 674 high school students a test of logical inference and stated 
the results supported the hypothesis, "that consistent response sets or cognitive 
styles can be identified by con figural analysis of a single test". Arullysis was based 
totally on errors. 
That the importance of the Chapman and Chapman study has not been recognized 
in indicated by a recent book in which McGuire (40) says logical thinking is said to 
exist in the likelihood of adhering more closely to logical conclusioJW, and wishful 
thinking is said to exist in the likelihood of adhering more closely to the "desired" 
state. It is necessary for him to assume emotional influence to make this statement. 
This blind assumption led 1\1cGulre to make a serious design flaw in an e:xperi-
ment in social psychology he later reported (3D). He con.stru.cted 16 syllogisms, then 
mixed the lG major, 16 minor premises a.ndthe 16 conclusions into a 48 item question-
naire. He had 120 college freshmen rate each item for ''probabllityu and "rlesh·ability". 
Then during th3 following week, he selectively sent persuasive messages to half the 
group. and re-arranged the items into syllogistic form. At the end of the week, he 
re-adminiatered the revised form and reported that for both the persuaded group and 
tho control group t 10 discrepancy between probability and desirability had declined. 
lie c,;plained that the improvement for the control group was because when the items 
were put together into sylloglstic fonn, the conclusions were made more tenable to 
the subjects because the two premises and conclusion were "contiguous in a. Socratic 
effect11 • It is mora likely that the discrepancy between probability (VALIDITY) and 
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desh-abillty (TRUTH) lessened when the problems became solvable. The only 
reason any discrepancy remained may be because of inherent differences in logical 
reasoning ability. which differences were assured when McGuire limited his sub-
jects to, as he says. "the lowest 30% of academic achievers". He has made his 
problems available through the American Documentation Institute and an examina-
tion of them suggests that had he used the highest 30% of acatlemic achievers he 
would have failed to find the statistical clifference that he advances to support his 
hypothesis. 
Turning o.gain to the conclusions arising from the research along the line of 
development of rensoning in children. the question left unsettled was whether reason-
ing ability was more closely related to the child's learning experiences or to emergence 
of innate abUities. A study by Beaumariage (2) in 1960 tends to contradict the pre-
viously accumulated evidence. He administered both the California Mental !\-Iatu.rity 
Test and Cyril Burt•s graded Reasoning Test to 4th, 5th, and 6th grade pupils. He 
found Spearman ranl' differance correlations significant and in the vicinity of. no, 
which throws some doubts on the previous evidence of orderly development of reason-
ing with e1q>erienoe. He finds logical nbility more closely related to mental age than 
to chronological age. 
1\trning again also to the line of research dealing with physical effects on 
reasoning, a. study by Broglla.mn1or and IIulmstock (5) tends to contradict in 1960 
the previous conclusions. He reports that ''Results with ten normal males and fe-
males indicate that ability to remember decreases unrler the influence of Uim-25, 
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but logical reasoning remains constant. ,. The importance of this study is hard to 
judge. It is a German experiment; the test used is the Amthauer Jntelltgence Struc-
ture Test; and the original reference is not available. If the author's conclusions 
may be accepted as they are stated. it is strong evidence that logic remains unchanged 
under the influence of a physical stimulus, wldch would favor logical ability as inherent. 
By 1950 then, all lines of evidence that had been accumulating for the previous 
25 years and largely accepted into the mainstream of psychology had been subjected 
to severe doubts. By 1960, the issue was again an open one. It is now appropriate 
to examine the evidence brought since 1960 to determine whether anything further can 
be brought to bear on the question at hand. For convenience I have divided the more 
recent evidence into two main lines of research. 
Ono recent line of research I refer to as those attempts that have been made to 
construct logic tests which will predict criteria, a relatively recent move, for which 
Stewart (70) is the most active spokesman. The other is the relations of logical ability 
to other factors. in which Morgan (45)* dominates the field. Those relating to criteria 
will be examined first. 
A. Criteria studios. 
The first study in which reasoning scores wore validated against independent 
criteria is one by the U.s. Department of the Army (80) published in W53 without an 
author credited. 65 reasoning problems were administered to 2.25 basic military 
*Actually Morgan did all of her work prior to l:J60, but I have included her 
in the post-1U60 section as ahead of her time in the sense that she 'vas free of 
the bias' prevailing before 195\}. 
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trainees in addition to th.;) standard Army Classification Battery, composed of ten 
standard tests. All 75 sco1•es were validated agairu.lt usual milita1·y crltet·ia of 
train1ng success. The best single predictor (. 35, si;:,-nilicant past • 01) was a verbal 
classification test on the regular ACB, but it was noted th:lt 11soveral reasoning 
factors appear to offer promise of increasing the predictive efficiency of the ACB." 
The reasoning factors involved were not discussed, and no further inforruation hoB 
been made public. 
In 1959 Morgan (·:1.7) reported the 1·esults of administering a 75-item deductive 
roo.so11ing test to 97 finalists in the Westinghouse National Science Talent Search over 
three years. Tho winners were exceptionally talented youth, so Morgan offered the 
mea..'lS of several groups for selection as a control group. Among them were engi-
neers, la\vyers, and c,,llege gTaduatas selected as "e:cecutivo potential". The 
Science Talent winners scored significantly higher (past • 01) than any of the control 
groups and tho author concluded tho test was successful in rncasurlng the 1•easonlng 
ability neccasary to scientific talent. Her assun1ption thnt science is based on de-
ductive logic can be disputed. (e. g. , Popper (61) says its is baaed on inductivo reason-
ing) but her results are suggestive to the issue of this discussi011. It n1ight mean 
that inherent logical ability UDJlerlies science talent, but when IvlcCoy (37) COl7ipared 
college seniors majoring in scionce and non-science subjects, holding intelligence 
constant, he failed to find such a difference. On the other hand :Morgan's results may 
indicate that logic is an inherent trait related to iutellige11ce. 
In 1962, Sister Ca.t"lisi.a did an 07llaustive study (7) among po.rochinl school math 
students aimed nt isolating those factors underlying mnth ability. Utilizing ten 
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standardized znnth tests, plus 36 more of her own, she did a factor analysis. 
Three facto1·s emerged: education, organization, and reasoning. (She also notes, 
incidentally, that the "number factor" has no relation to math ability). Later she 
was able to predict math ability validly for parochial school students from the 
three factors. 
In 1961 Davis (10) in reporting on measurement of mental skllls in the Air 
Force commented, "Arithmetic reasoning items are widely used in Air Force 
personnel selection tests because of their high rellabllity and validity for a wide 
range of performance criteria. n Arithmetic reason:i••1g is :mainly deductive 
reasoning. 
Valentine (Sl) reported in the British Journal of :muucational Psychology in 
1961 that "a reasoning test" administered to over 1, 000 applicants to British "uni-
versity and training college" students was succeesfttl in predicting which scholars 
later earned academic honors. He also noted that the reasoninr; test "seems relatively 
independent of education. " If it is true that a reasoning test achieved criterion validity 
and was independent of education, it would be extremely strong evidence in favor of 
logical reasoning as innate. However, only the Psycholor:,1cal Abstracts summary 
of Valentine's paper is available for this discussion. 
In his doctoral thesis in WOI, Stewart (70) states that he made tperhaps the 
first attempt at predictive v:lluo of a logic test." This is a bit immodest in light of 
the U.S. Army (80), the Morgnn (47), the Cnnisia (7), and the Valentine (81) attempts, 
but in any case Stewart•s attempt is an unusllll.lly well-designed onll in the history of 
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logical reasoning research. He is the first to take note of the three forms of logio 
pr-oblems. Former testers either restricted themselves to syllogisms (2,8,20,32, 
50 ,62.65, 77,85 ,87); mir.ed dG(.luctive problems freely (1,4, 7, 9 ,12, 27,31,37 ,38,39, 
43,•!5,46,47 ,48,1:::>,58); mixed deductive and inductive (5,6,13,18,19,20,23,24,28, 
30 t 35, 36.80, 83), or failed to report the type of problems used (~~3, 59). Stewart 
constructed his test of 45 C!educttvu verbal problemsi 15 modus ponens, 15 modus 
tollens, anr115 syllogisms.* 
High logic Rcorers were predicted to do better thnn low logic scorers on 
three criteria: reading comprehension, verbal ability, and gTade point average, 
criteria measures baing drawn independently. Differences wore as predicted and 
signilicant. His results do not benr of the issue of innatoness for his criterion 
Ineasures are such hi~:>;h o1"d.er cognitive tasks that whether logic is innate or acquired 
it is more basic than they. 
Of more interest from his study is another finding. He notos that modus tollens 
is the type of item most missed. Modus tollens inferences are drawn from the predi-
cate, so that errors in modus toll ens are mostly n matter of accepting the converse 
of a statement, the same popular error that Chapman nnd Chapman noted. 
With this distinction in mind, Stewart has re-ex.amined the "atmosphere affect" 
again with the additional control (type of problem) that Chapman and Chapman did 
Modus ponens: P:> Q 
..E._ 
:. Q 
Mor.lu.s tollens: P=>Q 
_::::9 
••• p 
Syllogism: P=>Q 
Q?R 
.'. P.:> n 
-29-
not have. Constructing n. test of the three types of problems, subdivided into prop-
ositional and a.ssertical forma, and 1i.trther subdivided into in positive and negative 
content (73), he found the atmosphere effect operating in aU three propositional forma 
and in a.ssertical rnodus ponens and syllogisms. The one exception 1s the assertical 
modus tollens, which includes the bulk of items in which one is tempted to ace apt 
tho collverse. Since tho aasertical form is the most common in everyday usage, it 
would appear at ilrst glance that Stewart frund precisely the f.allacy moot common in 
the results of Von Domarus and Chapman and Chapman, is the one moot resistent to 
the atmosphere effect, which Implies that not only schizophrenics but most people 
commonly operate outside the Aristotelian law of the excluded middle. 
One must look past this first glance, however, for in spite of hiB many excel ... 
lent controls, Stewart ignored the example of Chapman and Chapman and based his 
anal,!'BW on errors alone. where correct responses were possible. He allows the 
possibility that his results are limited1 and heavily weighted to, less logical (perhaps 
inh~-reutly) subjects. The end result may be that high solvers may miss a few of the 
difficult modus toll ens. but they are not subject to any atmosphere effect. 
{ 
Although this keeps Stewart's results from entering the discussion of inherence, 
it by no means diminishes the important work he has done in demonstrating a necessary 
new control. His work on control continues; recently be reported (72) on a compari--
son for reliability between tests of 30, 42, 54, and 66 items with controls for form, 
type of problem, and emotional tone of content. 
Stewart carries this control further in another discussion (71). He points out 
that o.ll tests purporting to measure critical thinking nlthoogh using a variety of 
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combinations of loglcallaws, always use the Principle of Inference. Whitehead and 
Russell (84) define the principle of inference, "Where P.:lQ is TRUE, and Pis TRUE, 
Q is TRUE." In discussing use of reasoning, or in psychological testing when we 
say someone does not possess a certain law of logic (aay, the excluded middle), we 
always implicitly assume that he does possess the pl'inciple of inference. "It fol-
lows then ••• and tho e;tq>erimental variable 1n each case is the law from·which infer-
ences are made." All the experiments dealing with syllogisms (2,8,26,32,50 ,62,65, 
66,77, 85. 87) nnd all those dealing with the fallacy of the undistributed middle (1, 8, 29, 
55,82) are subject to this criticism. In every case they compared sk.tll on syllO'Gfsms 
with lack of skill on sy1logis111S, by errors. The comparison could hava been, Stewart 
says. with modus ponens as representing a relatively primitive principle of inference. 
If all the studies were re..examined and the statistical test made this way instead of 
as they were, the results might be different. 
Moat of the pre-Stewart studies are not well enough reported to re-examine in 
this light, but the Chnpman and Chapman study is. They found an overwhelming 
tendency to accept the converse~ a failure in modus tollens and in predicative syllog-
isms. However, if they bad found errors in modus ponens to the same e:dent the 
principle of infe1·ence itself might have been lacldng. Looldng again at their data it 
can be seen that errors in modus ponens are virtually lacking. Their results are 
still significant by Stewart's new standard. 
At this point Stewart's results do not bear directly on the issue of whether 
logical reasoning ia innate. But he is apparently still publishing, and if he continues 
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adding controls in his prooent vein, he may ultimately develop a test so pure that 
the question can be answered directly. (That is, a teat that peq:>le score on in a 
normal distribution, l'(%'Ul'clleaa of training.) 
B. Relational studios. 
Although concurrent relatlonsbips in themselves do not establish causal 
relationships, they constitute most of the data from which predictive hypotheses 
are formed, especially, in the behavioral sciences. To this end, the studies show-
ing relationships between logical reasoning ability and other factors will be examined. 
In 1956 Morgan (46) published the results of a comparison b~tween a verbal 
deductive reasoning test and age nnd education. Interprotin::rformer research as 
suggesting that acquired abilities remain while more inherent factors decline with 
age, Morgan compared men in their twenties with men in their thirties, both groups 
divided between bachelors degree a11d masters degree holders. The younger group 
scored significantly higher (. 01) for bachelors but not significantly for the musters. 
This would tend to indicate that logical ability, like intelligence, declines with age 
and tends to support its inhel'enoo. The author does not quickly so conclude, however, 
on the chance that since all testoes were applicants for jobs it is possible that the 
younger group were on the whole superior for bachelors but not masters. This pos-
sibility is speculative, as the author offers no evidence for it. Failing to accept her 
speculation, the only block to interpreting the eJq>ariment as supporting inherence is 
the question of whether inherent abilities do decline with age. Although Sward (74) 
found no evidence of declL.1e in superior men, Wechsler (83) is representative of the 
many researchers who note that the more independent a single skill is of education 
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the more likely it is to decline with age. Probably the most interesting of thesa 
studios is one by Ni and Hsiao (54) 1n Taiwan. After finding mental declination among 
7,397 retired servicemen in a roughly linear decrease on the Beta intelligence teat and 
the M.innesota Spatial Relations Test. they end their article with a note re-affirming 
their raspect for their elders. :More closely related. however, is one by Glanzer 
and Glaser (17). They tested in both cross-section and longitudinally to probe for 
age-related changes with a battery of 14 mental abilities tests. 8 of 14 showed a de-
cllne, but four showed a net increase. Although the authors made no note of it, it 
is intriguing in the present discussion to note that "numerical computation," "numerica 
approximation", and "mathematical reasoning" were among the four showing an in-
crease! This presents the most serious block to interpreting the Morgan stuc.>y on 
age as supporting innate logical ability. 
Another study by Morgan (".1:5) concerned sex differences ln logical reasoning. 
M.ost othar researchers foand no sax dlffet•ence (2,4,6,8,0,12,32,37 ,38,46.55,58,60, 
8:1) and only Kostik foo.nd such a difference (30). :Morgan also, found no difference. 
' 
Tandon (76) inclt1ded subtaats of "comprehensive reasoning" and "drawing in ... 
ferancestt in a g-eneral intelligence test given 120 university students ond found the 
"comprehensive reasoni11g" scale had a zero correlation with the rest of tho subtests, 
while the "drawing inferences" subscale correlated on the • 05 level with others. 
If It may be assumed that the "inierences" is a purer reasoning measure, these re-
sults mildly tend to relate intelligence and reasoning. 
Evans (12) added to addence about logic incidentally when he used programmed 
symbolic logic in investigatinr; ttteachlng machine" variables. He reported cortain 
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findings relating to setting up learning programs for the "machine", but of n1ore 
interest here is that in three criteria of learning logic (time spent, time taken on 
tests, errors on teatS) by college students there was no difference for sex mathe-
matical experience, or class in school. This is some suggestion that logical learn-
ing ability is not as much dependent on acquired related e::1poriences as on direet 
acquisition, or perhaps, inherence. 
McCoy (38) made a direct comparison of lob1cal test scores and intelligence. 
For various verbal intelligonce testa tho correlation with the Morgan 'fest of Logical 
Reasoning far 95 college students was .49, significnnt past .01; and the correlation 
between the Morgan Test and the WAJS for 18 students was • 70, also significant be-
yond • 01. Interestmgly, the Wechsler subtest with tho lowest correlation to the 
Morgan was the Similarities, with an r of .13, not significant. Why the Similarities 
does not correlate with the :Morgnn when \Vecbsler calls the Similarities a reasoning 
test may be because the Mol"G~m is deductive while the Similarities 1s inductive. In 
this respect, the deductive Wechsler subteat.s (Arithmetic and Object Assembly) are 
among the highest subtest correlations with the J.',iorgan. McCoy's study suggests that 
the relation between deductive lor-).c and intelligence may be because both are inherent 
qunlities, but it does not rule out the possibility that intelligence aids in acquisition 
of logic. 
No doubt the most important of all the relational studies reported is one by 
Morgan and lVlorgan (48) comparing p<..-rsons who had completed a. cou1·se in logic in 
colle~--e with those who h.."td not. This comes th.e closest a relational study can to the 
I'> A -u~-
issue at band. Two groups of college graduates, 67 in each gr~1p, ware matched 
for sex, age, and collegGdogree. Those without training in lot~ic scored much nbovo 
cbrulce, but significantly lower than those with logic training (. 01). The first imprcs-
sion of the study is that the difference is due to training. However, the difference is 
disturbingly small; those withw.t training scored a moon of 21 compared to 29 for 
those with. on a test where scoros could go as high as 75. Furthermore, about a 
third of those without training scored higher than tho trained group mean. 'fhis seems 
to make clear that is logic is learned, it is primarily learned outside the logic class-
room. 
The authors ware not satisfied with accepting the conclusion that the study showed 
logic to be acquired. They raised three questions: (1) i.s logical ability related to 
intelligence? (Later answered affirmatively by Beaumariage and then lvlcCoy); (2) 
Do more logical students matriculate into logic classes 'l ; and (3) How much logic 
is letu-ned in tho classroo:rr; :? The present study bears directly on these latter two 
questions. If as Morgan a...'ld Morgan hint, logic classes teach little logic, then not 
only might logical ability be inherent, but tho Morgan Test of Logical Reasoning may 
ba a new instrument at the disposal of psychologists to measure this inherent quality! 
Before any further assumptions are made as to the efficacy of lo{,1c courses (or half 
pages on it in psychology texts) the possibilities of the I<.1orga:n Test of Logical Reason-
ing need to be fully esplored. 
Preliminary to the present paper the author atb:n:inlatered the Morgan Test of 
Logical Reasoning to ten logic classes taught by sL"' <.lifforent professors in seven 
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different schools in t..lto period 1958 to 1060. . ln every case the logic class failed 
to sign!Uca.ntly improve ita mmn score on the re-test at the end of the course over 
tho pre .. test at the beginning of the courset This seems to have given the teaching 
of logic nn adequ.ate opportunity to detnonstrate that logical skills are acquired, if 
the Morgan Toot is accepted as a valid measure of logical1·easoning. Validity of 
the M.organ is based on (1) face validity (it is, afteT all, a test of 75logic problems), 
(2) predictive validity 1n choosing job candidates in personnel pracUce (no rigorous 
study made), (3) relation to exceptional scientific achievement in youth, (4) relation 
to intelligence. This leaves the construct validity of the test still lacking, but the 
relationships and the distribution of scores show the Morgan Test measures something. 
It may llleasure verbal intelligence. hl fact, thiS is a good possibility, a.s the 
test is long and difficult by any standards and high scores are rare. It is reasonable 
to ask 1i the 1\iorgan is simply so difficult that it is nn intelligence test. The most 
direct answer to this question is to validate a short form of the Morgan containing the 
cora discriminating ability of the original. This is not to say that the ?tlorgan needs 
to be re\ised for applied use* which may sacrifice its unique quality, but is rather 
moant as a short excursion away from the original to answer the moat needling, quos-
t1on about it. If a short form Re\1Dion can be validated against logic training 1n the 
ctnsaroom, lt would sugr;est that the lonrJ form is simply insensitive to training, probably 
because 1t iB so long nnd difficult. If the short for:z-~.1, liko its parent, also fails to 
*However, it should be revised in any cru:.;e, to take into n.ccoonr the results 
of Chapman and Chapman and Stewart, nnd to ma.lze it less cumbersome. 
-36-
differentiate trained tUld untrained logicians, it would suggest that the long form 
measures inherent ability. 
Pu;mose: The purpose of the present study is to validate a short form Revision of 
the :Morgan Test of Logical Reasoning (49) against the criteria that can be derived 
from the assumption th.:'lt a regular college course in formal logic improves logical 
reasoning ability. The purpose willl>a met if validation is supported per examina.-
tion of the following three hypotheses: 
1st HYPOTHESJS: SCORES OF THE SHORT FORM REVISION ARE 
CLOSELY RELATED TO SCORES OF THE ORIGINAL :MORGAN TEST 
OF LOGICAL REASONING. 
2nd HYPOTHESffi: SCORES OF THE SHORT FORM REVISION ARE 
IUGHER FOR A GROUP INSTRUCTED IN LOGIC THAN li'OR A CONTROL 
GROUP. 
3rd HYPOTHESIS: SCORES OF THE SHORT FORM REVISION ARE 
CLOSELY RELATED TO SUCCESS lli LEARNING LOGIC. 
To meet the immediate purpose of the present si~1.ldy, validation of the short 
form Revision, will also add evidence to the llllique position of the Morgan Teat of 
Logical Reasoning in the la.rgor thooretl.a question of whether logical reasoning 
ability is to be considered inherent or acquired. To fnil to meet the present purpose 
might also add evidence in the Iro~ger question. 
But in either event, the procedure of the present study is confined to the im-
mediate purpose, and any comments on the larger question are left to discussion. 
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CHAPTER U .. PROCEDURE 
Q2_nstruction of the Revision: An item analysis was performed on the :M.organ 1 ... est 
of Logical Reasoning. 'l""he answer shoots of 258 college silldents we1·e used. None 
of tho subjects whose nnswers were used ill the item analysis were in the present 
e~eriment. The students on the item analysis had attended different schools and 
had nll completed a colleg-e course in logic. The sru:nplo appeared to be typically 
distributed as to Morg;an sco1~es, i.e •• they fell into an essentially normal curve 
but with some positive skowness. 
The 258 answer blnnks we1•e divided into three Morgau score levels: hip;h 
- 40 or over, middle - 10 through 39, and low - 9 or under. The mean Morgan 
scoi·e for college students is about 22. The high group included 70 answer shoots, 
the mic..'lrlle had 130, and the low was 58. For each item there was tabulated: (1) how 
many of tho testees in tho level had completed it, (2) how many of those who had com-
pleted it had it correct, (3) the percentage of those who had completed !t who had it 
co1"rect, and (4) the said percentage minus 50. The tabulation in four colurrJ.l1S for 
each levol is in Appendix IV. 
After tabulation, the •'value" of each. item was computed from the following 
formula: 
value 
whore D 1a the percootage of tea tees in the lavol who had the item correct minus 50, 
and "h", "n'in, and ''1" are high, :midtlle, and low lovols. The difference for the 
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middle group was ~'llcen as ru1 absolute value so that any distribution of tho middle 
group other th..'l.ll a 50%-50% split detractod from the item volua. The mi<ldle term 
is an adclltion to the usual formultt for item analynls item value and is intended for 
its effect in degrading the value of items either too difficult or too easy. Usually 
it is intended in a Revision to retain items of varying difficulty level, but in the 
present case the task of shortening a 75 item teat to a short form required extensive 
discarding of items while attempting to retain the core discriminating value of the 
test. By this method the ''valuon of each of tho 7G items on the original :Morgan Test 
of Logical Reasoning was computed; the results are also in Appendix IV. 
seventeen of the twenty problems with the highoot item analysis value were 
selected for the Revision. Three other items of lower value were added to make the 
test exactly 20 items long for eru.der scoring.* Items were reto.ined in the same aerial 
order they had in the l't<Iorgan. 'D1e directions for the Revision were re-written from 
the 1\lorgan directio:rlS to improve clarity. These twenty ita1ns and tha re-written di-
rections, in mimeograph form t constitute the Revision. 
Experimental procedure: The e:xparimentnl group wna an ordinary college logic 
class. The control group was a college course tn :introductory psychology. Both 
were taught in the same school in the an.me semester. No student was enrolled in 
both classes. The only pre-requisite for the psychology course was sophomore or 
higher status; there wns no pre-requisite for the logic class, but it included no 
*Failure to use the top twenty items, as intended, was a clerical error. 
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freshman. The two classes were comparable in distribution of age, so:t, and col-
lege major. 
The first day of the semester the or:perimenter met etwh class and explained 
the oxnot nature and intent of the O"'A;periment, and asked for voluntary coopo1-ation, 
Students were assured that all logic scores would be withheld from their respective 
instructors until final grades for the courses were recordt.>d. All volunteered. Aftcar 
the fil·ot day, one more student rnatriculated into the psychology class late and wns 
not used in the experiment. 
After the explanation and still during the Hrst class meeting each class was 
administered the Morgan Teat of Logical Reasoning. No time limit was set or nJen-
tioned and no one inquired about one. All te&tees finished before the class period ex-
pired, the longest taking 44 minutes. On the second day of class before instruction 
commenced, each ciass was given the Revision. No time lhnit was mentioned; the 
longest time taken was 22 minutes. During the last week of classes in the semester, 
each class was again g.iven the :MorJ;,ran Test. During the examination period and priol 
to the class exam, each class was administered the Revision. In th0 re-testing no 
time limits were set, and the tm~es taken by the slowest students was only slightly 
more than in the first administrations. 
Tho logic professor agreed to refrain from discussing any item on either test 
form duriug the course. He surrendered course §'Tades to the eJ.-perirnenter before 
being informed of the scores of any students. 
The level of motivation of the subjects may be inferred from the fact that 10 of 
the 20 psychology students and il ol the 20 logic students addressed postcards made 
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available to them to be mailed their scores and the outcome of the experiment aftar 
the end of the study. 
The Morgan scores are number-right-n1inus-number-wrong, the authors' cor-
rection for guessing* (48), and the Revision was scored the same way. A copy of the 
Revision is Appendix V. The Morgan Test of L?gical Reasoning is copyrighted and 
available fron1 the authors (49). 
* The actual formula to correct for guessing is number right minus J=t 
times the number wrong, where "n" is the number of choices per it$m. 
In the case of the Morgan and the Revision there are only two choices so the 
forr.aula reduces to number-right-minus-number-wrong. 
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CHAPTEB m - RESULTS 
Raw scores of both the :r.lorgan Test of Logical Reasoning anct its present 
Revision are presentel~ in Append.ix I. The raw score n~ea!i for the Morr,;au Test 
was 20, very cL>se to the means of !~2 and 23 formerly reported for college stu-
dents (38,46); the standard deviation was 16. 3, also in keeping witl1 standard 
deviation formerly reported (38,45,,J6). The Uevislon mean wns 0, many of the 
scores being minus values. The stn.ndnrd devintion of the Revision raw scores 
w::tS a. o. 
All scores on each test were transformed into z-scores as defined by Under-
wood (!12) and the tabulated z-s:.:ores are presented in Appendix II. From this point 
all further analysis was done solely with the z-scores so that the o1·iginal Morgan, 
its Revision, and course gradea could be directly compared in spite of difference in 
means and ranges. 
Test and the 1st hypothesis: ln its null forn1 (SCORES OF THE SHORT FORM. 
REVI3ION ARE NOT CLOSELY RELATED TO SCORES OF TIIB ORIGINAL MORGAN 
T.EST OF LOGICAL REASONING) the first hypothesis concerns how closely the Revision 
retained the measuring characteristics of the original. The test of this hypothesis is 
the familiar Pearson proc.~.ct-moment correlation. In this instance it was convenient 
to apply the z-score forrn of the correlation techniquet as described by Underwood (92). 
The r yielded is • 78, a reasonably high correlation for this type of measurement, and 
significant beyond the . 01 level of probability. The first null hypothesis is held un-
tenable and the close relation of the Morgan and Revision unchallenged. This relationship 
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establishes nothing about the validity of either form, but is a minimal necessity 
to demonstrate before proceeding in the analysis. It is recognized that three factors 
tend to inflate the correlation: (l) it is a whole-part correlation, (2) the procedure 
nllowa the possibility of carry-over in memory of items from one form to the next 
in following-day adminiatrationR, · and (3) using both pre- and post-scores on 40 sub-
jects for 80 scores. These considerations require that a high and significant r be 
established before proceeding, and such is the case. 
Test of the 2nd hYJ?otbesis: In its null form (SCOUES OP THE SHORT FORM 
REVISION OF THE MORGAN TEST OF LOGICAL REASONING ARE NO HIGHER FOR A 
GROUP INSTRUCTED IN LOGIC THAN FOR A CONTROL GROUP) the second hypothesis 
raises one possible criterion for concurrent validity of the Revision. The necessary 
assumption is that those persons who have just completed a college course in logic 
are h1 fact somewhat superior 1n logical reasoning ability to those who have not taken 
micb i.nf;truction. 
In consideration of the possibility tlmt tho two classes might differ in initial 
logical reasoning ability before instruction begins, the design is analysis oi co-variance, 
as outlined by Lindquist (91). In this case the co-variate is the pre-course scores on 
the tests of both groups prior to L11struction. That is, tho xrjeans of the two groups 
are compared after one rl3.8 received treatment, but with the post-treatment rr;eans 
corrected for the difference in pre-treatment means. 
The rebulte of tile analysis of variauce of the pre-treatment means of the two 
groups are presented in figure 2. The F is not significant, indicating that the variance 
of scores between the eJ;perlrr;ental and the control t,rrOttp could well have been expected 
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Source of variation !l_Ums of sguares df mean squares F 
-
BETWEEN E & C .18 1 .18 .23 
\VITHIN GROUPS 29.56 38 .78 
TOTAL 29.74 39 
Figure 2. Analysis of variance, pre-treatment Revision scores. 
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by chance. The second step in the analysis of co-variance is the analysis of variance 
of the post-treatment Re\lision scores of the two groups. This F was significant, but 
the initial (though non-significant) difference between the two groups is not yet ac-
counted for. 'l'his correction is done in the analysis of co-variance and the rosults are 
tabulated in figure 3. The F is significant beyond the . G 1 level. Significance of this 
F indicates that the difference found between the Logic and Psychology classes aiter 
instruction can not be accounted for by pre-instruction plus chance differences. 
The second null hypothesis then, 1s held untenable and the validity of the Revi-
sion is supported. 
At this point it is interesting to digress from the central intent of the analysis 
and compare the two classes on the original Morgan Test 1n the manner just done for 
the Revision, although this does not bear on the validation of the Revision. It is 
interesting to do so because in previous studies the I .. 1organ Test has consistently 
failed to show a post-instruction ga.tn, as the Revision just has (38). This fact in 
previous studies underlies the present author's hypothesis about the ·Morgan's insensi-
tivity to logic training. Analyses of variance for pre-instruction and post-instruction 
differences are tabulated in figures 4 and 5, respectively. Since neither F is Signifi-
cant, it is apparent that the classes did not differ on the Morgan Test before or after 
the Logic class received instruction. An analysis of co-variance is unnecessru:y; for 
the eleventh time the Mort,ran Test has failed to show any gain in logical reasoning 
ability for persons who have completed a college logic course! 
Source of variation 
TOTAL 
WITHIN 
ADJUSTED .MEANS 
38 
37 
1 
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mean squares 
.48 
5.49 
l•'igure 8. Analysis of Co-variance, post-treatment Revision scores. 
F 
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Source of variation num of squares df mean squares F 
BET\VEEN E AND C .us 1 • 63 .76 
WITHIN GROUPS ~1.50 38 8') • L) 
TOTAL ~~2. 1~.~ ~{(} 
Figura 4. Analysis of variance, pre-treatment Morgan scores. 
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Source of variation sum of squares df mean squares 
BETWEEN E AND C 1.10 1 1.10 1.02 
\VITHIN GROUPS 41.11 38 1.08 
TOTAL 42.21 
Fi&ure 5, Aualysis of variance, post-treatment 1V1organ scores. 
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Test of the ~3rd hXJlothesis: Stated in its null form (SCORES OF THE SHORT 
FORM REVISION OF THE MORGAN TEST OF LOGICAL REASONING ARE NOT 
CLOSELY RELATED TO SUCCESS IN LEARNING LOGIC) the third hypothesis 
raises the logic instructor's estimates of performance in a logic course as a pos-
sibly more refined criterion for validity of a test of logical reasoning. 
The appropriate test is a correlation of the logic professor's overall course 
grades with the post-instruction administration of the Revision. To make this com-
parison it was necessary to transform the professor's grades into z-scorea. The 
logic class grades both in raw form and in z-form are shown 1n Appendix m. The 
raw so ore course grade average was 2. 68, and the standard deviation was • SG. For 
this eomparisun it 1s also necessary to recompute the mean and standard deviation 
of the Revision scores, limiting them to those directly concerned in this correlation. 
In this lesser case the mean is 4. 3, which is conspicuously higher than the overall 
Revision mean of zero. The lesser standard deviation 1e 7 .4, about the same as the 
overall Revisions. D. of 8. o. 
The correlation coefficient is • 31 which suggests some relationship and is r~sl-
tive, butts not statistically significant for this N. The likelihood of this relationship 
having occurred by chance justifies the 3rd null hypothesis, failing to enhance the pro-
posed criterion validity. • Although the range of class grades assigned by the i.nstruc-
tor was quite narrow, tending to deflate this correlation, o.dherence to standards of 
scientific ncceptanoo dictate dismissal of this relationship as probably not meaningful. 
* Correlation of the Morgan post-test scores with instTUctor grades is • 16, 
nlso not significant. 
CHAPTEH IV - DISCUSSION 
The high and significant correlation between the nevision and the original 
Morgan Test of Logical Reasoning certainly shows a high relationship between the 
two. A high correlation between the whi>lc and a part of the same test would be 
e.;sq.>ectcd in any case where tha Revision is deliberately constructed from the items 
of tho original shown by item analysis to be most contributory to the total test score. 
The close relationship, then, is not unexpected. A more telling comparison than 
the correlation is the con:tparison of distributions of the Morgan and the Revision in 
this study. The distribution of scores are plotted togother in figure 6, and it is seen 
that the two curves are similar and probably measuring much the same quality. A. 
certain dissimilarity occurs, how over, in the low scores, which will be examined 
further later in the disc~1ssion. 
Concerning the second hypothesis, and the results demonstrating the superiority 
of the loc,:rfc-trained students over the control group, the obvious conclusion is truJ. 
the Revision is validated by this criterion. Tho first fact to be noted is that the two 
classes did not differ in logic ability prior to the start of the course. This in part 
answers the Morgans' question (48) of whether logic classes attract more logical 
students. The answer here is not and it is in keeping with unpublished former work 
by the present author in which a clnss in logic was compared to a clas~ taught by the 
same instructor in religion. There also, was no difference in pre-course Morgan 
scores. McCoy (38) also reported no difference between the mean IQ of logic; classes 
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Figure 6. Graphed distribution of frequency of scores on the .Morgan Test of 
Logical Reasoning nnd on the Hevision showing similarity of distributions. 
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and school mean IQ. And in seven different schools the present outhor found only 
one in which a prerequisite was posed for matriculation into the logic course. 
Generally, then, logic students show no evidence of being superior in logic before 
taking the course, and this is specifically true in the present study. The fn.ct then 
that the logic class was here superior on the Revision at the end of the course de-
monstrates at the least that the class as a whole did improve in logical skill. More 
important to the immediate purpose of this paper is that the Revision is validated 
by this criterion, and since at the same time the parent instrument did not show 
the same gain, the Revision is ulore sensitive to acquired logic skill. 
Turning to the third hypothesis, the logic professor's course grade was in 
effect an estimate of tho student's final1·easoning skill, and that both forms of the 
test failed to agree closely with it is, strictly speaking, against the validity of either 
form. It is possible to conclude either that. the tests failed to measure acquisition 
sensitively enough, of that the professor's grades were not sensitive enough (possibly 
because of their narrow range). For the pu.1-pose of this paper it has been assumed 
that the professor's grades do estimate success in leaJ."lling logic, so it ll1Ust be con-
cluded that the Revision failed in this criterion of validity. 
Vlhy the Morg;an failed to measure the effect of the learning while the Revision 
did may be due to the possible difference in motivation between the two forma. A 
student who has just finished a course in logic may feel he is ready to solve any logic 
problem, but when he sees a test which appears to hin1 long and difficult he may not 
make a complete effort on each item, but may attempt to get through rapidly. This 
would be plausible if most students typically got many of the first iter.Gs on the long 
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form correct, and then began missing 1ten1e. A glance at the item analysis shows 
thnt tllis is what happens. Observations of testee's behavior in the test eession also 
sut.,rgest this; students work slowly at first and then appear to be marking items with 
little consideration. Another interesting observation may be added to this; on three 
occasions in preliminary work logic professors sat down with their classes at the 
end of the course and also took the Morg;an. In all three cases they correctly tmswared 
all the items they attempted, but one finished only :32, and the other 39 anu 41. 
A serious detracting fact from the idea of differing motivation is the scoring of 
the logic students on the present Revision. If time and :~:notivation were the ruling 
factors, then on the short form which stmkmts complete-J in less than 20 minutes, 
scores shoold be quite high. 111 fact, they were quite low. The mean score of the 
logic students on the post-course Revision wns only 4. out of a possible 20. L"l this 
respect the Revision resembles its parent in that high scores are rare. 
Setting aside motivation, another explanation migi.1t be that the Morgan Teat, 
and its nevision, are both inherently verbal intelligence tests. This is hard to be-
lieve 1n the case of the 20-item test with no variation in type of task, but quite credible 
in the long nnd difficult original. In any event, it is obvious that there was a net gain 
for the class in logic skill and that the Revision registered it. 
This completes the tliscussion of the immediate intent of the present study; 
valldntion of the short form Revision was accomplished. But another examination 
is in order. Both the Morgan Test and the Revision were constructed prior to the 
excellent work of Stewart (68) on the nature of logic test items. Lack of his controls 
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does not in any sense invalidate the present study, as both OJq:~erimental and con-
trol groups were subject to precisely the same lack of controls. However, consider-
ation of the types of items employed by the original and the nevision sheds further 
light on differences between the forms. Stewart distinguished between three types 
of items (modus ponens, modus toll ens, and syllogisms) and two forma (proposi-
tional and assertical). The types and forms of the items in the Morgnn are stated 
in Appendix Vll. 
The Revision is composed of 12 assertical and 8 p1·oposit1onal items, a.nd 10 
modus ponens, 5 modus tollens, nnd 5 syllogisms. The distribution is shown in 
l'igure 7. The Morgan Test has 57 assertical nnd 18 propositional items, of which 
16 were modus ponens, 27 mor..lus tollena, and 32 syllogisms. 'Ibe distribution is 
shown in Figure 8. The dispnrHy between the two distributions is enlightening; the 
Morgan had assertical rnodus tollens and assertical syllogisms over-represented, 
while tho Revision is lacking in propositional syllogisms and asserticnl modus tollens. 
In light of Stewart's results, that assertical modus toll ens is most resistant 
to the atmosphore effect, aud his and Chapm.an and Chapman's findings that mod.us 
toll ens is the most difficult type of item, the Revision and the :Morgan differ 1:noat on 
the type of item moat significant. This is the result oi the item analysis which sys-
tematically eliminated the most difficult items (largely modus tollens) and the easiest 
(including propositional syllogisrus). In brief, the Re\1sion systematically eliminated 
the Morgan items most resistant to instruction. 'fl1is constitutes n serious criticisn 
against assumil1g that the Revision retained tho unique discriminating power of the 
Morgan. It does not challenge the validity of the Revision, b-..tt does suggest that U1e 
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Fig.rre 7. Distributioll of typos and forms of terms, R0vision. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of types and forms of items, :t.<lorr~an Test of Logical Reasoning. 
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present author sacrificed the core quality of the l'v1org'3ll that originnlly drew atten-
tion to the Morgan. TI1is ra.isos the distinct possibility that the .Morgan, whlch in 
its gross form does not 1-:neasure logic learning, in a purer form (lilnited 1nainly 
to its rnodus tollena) might h~ the exciting instrument its cumbersome form proposes. 
This would be the most prornising direction for further examination of the 
Morgan. It is not the direction that Stewru:t is presently pursuing. By his stundat·do, 
a toot to be comprehensive should include half emotional and half neutr:ll items (32), 
half univernal and half particular (65), half deductive and half inductive (G8}, half 
negative and half positive (87), half correct a11d half incorrect conclusions offered (8), 
half TRUE and l1nlf not (62), and a third modus ponens, a third modus toll ens, and a 
third syllogisms (68). Although no one h.as suggested it, perhaps half should be ver-
bal and half symbolic. Each category should be equally distributed in equal propor-
tions to all others. With only one item in each category the minir..mm number of items 
wou.ld be 384. On the other hand, if all former results are accepted, the putative 
basically ruost resistant lo{~ical ability could perhaps be most closely approached 
with but a hanclful of emotional, particular, deductive, negative, incorrectly supplied, 
unTRUE. verbal, modus tollens items. Interestingly, the Morgan Test includes a 
disproportionately large r..umber of such items. 
The immediate purpose of the present paper thus fully discussed, perhaps it 
is genna11.e to ask what has been added to the larger question of whether logical 
reasoning ability can be considered innate or learned. T'ne answer is that the present 
study failed to add any substantive evidence to the issue. Althou[;:t the validation pro-
posed wan accomplished which was hypothesized as against I11organ's measure being 
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of inherence, the post facto analysis after Stewart shovvs that the Revision may 
have failed to retain tho unLIUe core of the Morf.ran Test. But in the loss of this 
study to the larger question, a direction for further study is clearly indicated: 
logic students' performance on Ioodus ponens and subjective syllogisms should be 
compared with their parformance on modus tollens and predicaUve syllogisms. 
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CHAPTER V - SUMMARY 
Whether logical reaooning •lhility is inherent or acquired is unsettled. The 
r ... 1org;an Test of Logical Rea.soning stands at the top of evidence favoring innateness 
in that it remains unaffected by instruction in logic. But the Morgan is so long and 
difficult that it is possibly co11founded by motiva.tiou or intelligence. 
'l""he present study is an attempt to validate a short revised form of the Morgan 
against the one criterion that would remove the test from its unique position, acquired 
logic skill. 'i'he Revision c·)rrela.ted . 78 ·with the lHorgnn (p < . 01}, had a similar 
distribution of scores, and did validate against logic training (p < . 01). It failed 
to corr'elate with another criterion, course grade (p) .05). Glass differences in 
logical skill prior to instruction wore controlled by analysis of co-variance. 
Although the Revision was validated as hypothesized, a doser examination 
of the types of items in the two for-ms in the light of recent research revealed that the 
Revision systematically excluded a type of iter.:~ possibly giving the Morgan ita unique 
character. 
ConclusioM are: (1) the present Revision is n. valid instrument for discrirn1-
14'l.ting acquired logical sldll, but (2) the Revision is not U(;.."Cessn.rily a true short 
form of the original lUorgnn. No conclusions as to the laruer issue of innateness are 
possJble from this study, btlt the most promising direction for further research is 
suggested. 
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Appendix I 
M!YSCORES: Morg1m Test of Logical Reasoning; Revision 
E:~erbnentru Group (Logic class) 
PRE-TEST POST-'f.EST 
Morgan Revision lV!Or!!,rml Revision 
La 2:-s 4 19 4 
Lb 23 4 35 12 
Lo 15 -2 37 8 
Ld 45 12 53 20 
Lo 0. 
•' 
0 11 6 
I .. f 21 2 29 4 
Lg 7 -10 n -2 -u 
Lh 23 0 37 0 
Li 13 -8 11 -8 
Lj 13 -2 .. a -2 
Lk 27 -10 11 1 
Ll 19 -4 13 -G 
Lrn 39 14 35 9 
Ln 8 -6 23 -2 
Lo 25 2 36 18 
Lp 28 -2 29 8 
Lq 29 6 51 10 
Lr '1 ~· -6 22 -6 
Ls 19 -2 25 4 
Lt 25 0 a 8 
Average 20.7 -0.4 2:).1 4.3 
Control Group (Psychology class} 
Pa &. -10 -3 -1~1 
Pb 14 -2 22 0 
Pc 13 -2 J_7 -10 
Pd 6 -G 6 -6 
Po 7 -6 'l -2 
Pf 1 -12 -1 -10 
pn-b :.8 -2 lt; -2 
Ph 3 -4 1 ~, oJ -8 
Pi 1 ?. .L.-. 0 23 -4 
Pj Jw5 -10 1 -12 
Pk i4 0 7 -10 
Pl G 2 17 -10 
Pm 3.L -6 25 "> .. 
Pn ·~ 
" 
--:~ 1~ 6 
Po -lS -6 <) -12 
·-
Pp 61 20 57 20 
Pq 16 2 1)1 ... ~ -4 
Pr 38 4 33 8 
Ps 51 14 57 i4 
Pt 26 -1 41 2 
Average -t'l'S. 2 -=r.7 -nr.7 -=2:6 
---
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Appendix U 
Z-SCORES: Morgan Test of Logical Reasoning; Revision 
Exparir.oental Group (Logic Class) 
PRE-TEST POST-1'EST 
Morgan Revision Morgan Revision 
La .18 • 50 -.06 • 50 
Lb .18 • 50 .J2 l. 50 
Lc -.31 -.25 1. 04 1. 00 
Ld 1.53 1.50 2.02 2.50 
Le -.68 0.00 -.55 • 75 
Lf .06 .25 • 55 • 50 
Lg -.80 -l. 25 -1.41 -.25 
Lh .18 0.00 1. 04 o.oo 
I .. i --.43 -1.00 --.55 -1.00 
I .. j 
-. 
413 -.2~ :...1.•11 -.25 
Lk .48 -1.25 -.55 .13 
Ll -.06 -.50 -.43 -.73 
Lm 1.17 l. 75 • b2 1.13 
Ln -.67 -.75 .18 -.25 
Lo • 31 • 25 • 98 2.25 
Lp .4:> -.25 . 55 1.00 
Lq • 55 .75 1.. :)0 1.25 
Lr -1.04 -.75 .12 -.76 
La -.0(} -.25 • 31 • 50 
Lt • 31 0.00 .68 1. 00 
Total .91 -. ~~~ G.25 10.76 
Sum/squares 7.84 12.25 18. 'if) 23.04 
Control Group (.Poychology Class) 
Pa -1.17 -1.25 -1.41 -1.75 
Pb -. ~w -.26 .12 0.00 
Pc -.43 -.25 -.18 -1.25 
Pd -.86 -.75 -.86 -.75 
Pe -.80 -.73 -.80 -.25 
Pf -1.17 -t. 50 -1. 2D -1.25 
Pg -.12 -.25 -.OG -.25 
Ph -1. 0·1: -.50 -.43 -1.00 
Pi -.49 o.oo .18 -.50 
PJ -.31 -1.25 -1.17 -1.50 
Pk -. i~7 o.oo -.80 -1.25 
Pl -.86 . 25 -.18 -1.25 
Prn . 67 -.75 • ~~l • 25 
Pn -1.04 -.30 -.OG • 75 
Po -2.02 -.75 -1.04 -1.50 
Pp 2.52 2.50 2.88 2.50 
Pq -.25 2' • t) .06 -.50 
Pr t.lO • 50 • 80 1. 00 
Ps l. ~)0 1.75 2.27 1. 75 
pt • ::a -. L3 L29 ""-• ~·:J 
Total 4.13 -3.G:5 -.37 -(~. ~iO 
SUm/squares 24.55 18.02 24.28 27.00 
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Appendi.'C m 
LOGIC CLASS GRADES: raw grades assigned, and transkormatlon to z-scorcs 
Student Grade (Gl"ade) z-acore 
La c 2.0 -.81 
Lb B- 2.6 -.11 
Lc c 2.0 -.81 
I,tl A 4.0 1. 51 
Le A- 3.8 1.28 
. Lf B- 2.8 .11 
Lg c 2.0 -.81 
Lh D- 0. (i -2.44 
Li A-- 3.6 1.04 
Lj c 2.0 -.81 
Lk B 3.0 .35 
Ll c 2.0 -.81 
I .. m A- 3.8 1.28 
Ln c 2.0 -.81 
Lo C+ 2.2 -.58 
Lp C+ 2.2 -.58 
Lq B 3.0 .35 
Lr B s.o .35 
Ls B 3.0 .35 
Lt A 4.0 1. 51 
Total 53.6 
M.ean 7.18 
Sum/squares 158.48 
Standard deviation • 86 
18 70 70 100% 50 1.30 92 71% 21 58 36 6~;!, 12 50-/21/-12 ~ 17 
19 70 53 76% 26 128 110 86% 36 58 26 45% -5 26-/36/-(-5) = ... 
- a 
20 70 62 89% 39 127 126 99% 49 58 35 60% 10 39-/4tl/-IO := -20 
21 70 58 83% 33 127 73 57% 7 57 41 72% 12 33-/7/-12 '!: 14 
22 70 17 24%-26 127 112 88% 38 57 33 58% 8 
-26-/38/-8 = -72 
23 70 68 97% 47 126 109 87% 37 57 42 74% 24 47-/37/-24 '!: -14 
24 70 64 91% ,n 126 101 80% 30 57 19 33% -17 ,41-/30/-(-17) = 28 
25 70 70 100% 50 126 100 79% 29 57 23 •JO% -10 50-/29/-(-10) !:: 31 
26 70 35 50% 0 125 51 4:1% -9 57 18 32%-18 0-/-!J/-(-18) = 9 
27 70 70 100% 50 125 110 88% 38 57 52 91% •U so-/38/-~u = -29 
28 70 67 :36% 46 124 106 85% 35 56 27 48% -2 46-/35/-(-2) = 13 
29 70 70 100% 50 121 99 82% 32 54 12 22% -28 50-/32/-(-28) :: ~iG 
30 70 66 9•1,% 44 120 73 61% 11 54 26 <l8% -2 44-/11/-(-2) = 35 
31 70 36 51% 1 120 8!) 74% 24 54 39 7Zla 22 1-/~1/-22 = -45 
32 70 50 71% 21 120 21 18% -32 54 9 17% -33 21-/-32/-(-aa)-: 22 
33 70 61 87% 37 119 92 77%27 54 23 43% -7 37-/27 /-(-7) = 17 
34 70 64 91% 41 119 99 83% 33 54 31 57% 7 41-/33/-7 = 'f 
35 70 30 43% -7 116 27 23%-27 53 12 23% -27 -7-/-27/-(-27) = -7 
36 70 59 84% 34 114 62 54% 4 53 18 34% -16 34-/4/-(-16) = 46 
37 70 42 UO% 10 114 68 GO% 10 53 30 57% 7 10-/10/-7 = -7 
38 70 5'1 81% 31 114 47 41% -9 53 4 8% -42 31-/-9/-(-42) -=- 64 
39 70 65 93%43 113 :J5 84% 34 53 33 62% 12 43-/34/-12 = -3 
40 70 24 34% -16 112 27 24%-26 53 1 2% -48 -16-/-26/-(-48) ~ 6 
41 70 67 ()6% 46 110 102 :JS% 43 53 41 77 ,; 27 46-/43/-27 ::: -24 
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42 70 60 8G% 36 110 79 72% 22 53 14 26% -24 SG-/22/-(-24) = 38 
43 70 61 87% 37 110 69 81% 31 53 29 55% 5 37-/31/-5 = 1 
44 70 69 99%49 106 96 91% 41 53 28 53% 8 49-/41/-3 ~ 5 
45 70 67 96% 46 105 43 41% -9 53 9 17% -33 46-/-S/-(-33) = 70 
4t> 70 70 100% 50 104 06 92% 42 51 1)2 6,.,% .;, v 13 50-/42/-13 ~ ... s 
47 70 61 87% 37 100 41 41% -9 50 17 34% -16 37-/-9/-(-16) = ~l 
·~8 70 66 04% 44 100 50 50% 0 50 25 50% 0 44-/9/-0 = 44 
49 70 67 9G% 46 100 87 87% 37 50 25 50% 0 46-/37/-0 = 9 
GO 69 61 88% ~8 100 6"" 6-% a \>cl 15 50 23 46% -4 38-/15/-(-4) = 27 
51 69 69 100% 50 100 ill 91% •U 50 38 76% 26 50-/41/-26 
-
-17 
-
52 69 53 77% 27 $8 61 62% 12 50 16 32% -18 27-/12/-(-18) = 33 
53 68 54 7D% 20 S5 23 24% ·26 50 15 30% -20 2H-/-2o/-(-20) = 23 
54 68 49 72% 22 !)5 40 42% -8 50 0 O% -50 22-/-8/-(-50) = 64 
55 68 59 87% 37 95 5!) 62% 12 50 21 4:2% -a :)7-/12/-(-8) = 33 
56 67 63 94% 44 !)5 4ti 51% 1 50 28 56% 6 44-/1 I -G ::. 37 
57 65 61. 94% 44 95 G5 68% 18 50 15 30% -20 44-/18/-(-20) ::. 46 
58 65 8 12%-38 :)2 6 7% -43 50 13 2G% -24 -38-/-43/-(-2-.t) ~-57 
59 65 60 :12% 42 89 30 !H% -16 50 21 42'X, -8 42-/-16/-(-8) ::. 34 
GO D3 42 67% 17 89 29 33% -17 50 32 ti4% 14 17-/-17/-14 ~ -14 
61 62 37 60% 10 uo 46 51% 1 50 S8 7o% 2{) 10-/l/-26 ::. -17 
62 {}2 60 D7% 47 90 71 79% 20 50 113 86% 35 47-/29/-36 = ..... .18 
63 62 58 !34% 44 DO 62 691ib lD 4D 43 as~;{, 38 44-/lU/-SS ~ -13 
64 -GO 60 100% 50 so GS 76% 26 48 32 67% 17 50-/26/-17 :: 7 
-71-
65 59 57 97% 47 86 59 69% lD 46 25 5•1'J~ 4 47-/19/-4 = 24 
66 59 57 97% 47 84 71 85% ..,_ .,.) 46 26 78% 28 47-/35/-28 ::: -16 
67 59 54 82%42 84 67 80% :30 45 18 40% -10 42-/30/-(-10) ~ 22 
68 56 55 !)8% 48 84 Sil 46% -4 44 35 80% 30 48-/-4/-30 = 14 
6t:l 
v 55 55 100% 50 75 65 87% 37 44 34 77% 27 50-/37/-27 = -14 
70 54 40 74% 24 75 39 52% 2 ~14 26 50% 9 24-/2/-9 ~ 13 
71 53 39 74% 24 72 54 75% 25 44 11 25% -25 24-/25/-(-25) :: 24 
72 52 37 71% 21 72 43 60% 10 44 34 77% 27 21-10/-27 =: -16 
73 51 36 71% 21 72 60 83% 33 44 21 48% -2 21-/33/-(-2) ::. -10 
74 51 47 92% 42 70 35 50% 0 41 6 15% -35 42-/0/-(-35) :. 77 
75 50 44 88% S8 70 11> 21% -2!) 41 5 12% -38 38-/-29/-(-38) = ,17 
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Appendix V 
MORGAN TEST OF LOGICAL REASONING 
Copyright 1955 
William J. :Morgn.n, Ph. D. 
Antonia Morg,·a.n, M.A. 
APTITUDE ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Ii<1.errifield, Virgi.lua 
EXPERfi.1ENTAL REVlEION 
School Date 
------------------------------------------- ------------------
Name ~------------------------------------------------------------------
Arre ______ Sex _______ Year in Colleg-e---------------
:Major fiel:.l of ;:~tudy --------------------
Have you ever cm>.1pletet:l a course in logic? 
-------------------
* • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Number done , ___ _ 
Nurabor right 
----
Number wroll! ... r;__ _ 
Score (R-W). ___ _ 
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DIDECTIONS 
'l'his is a test in logical :reasoning ability. It consists of pl'·:>blems requir-
ing logical reaeoning. AU the problems have one or mora premwes t and then a 
conclmdon beglnninl~ with the word "thercforeu. You arc to judge whether the 
conclusion follows logically from the premises using on;t~ the evidence given in 
tho pre:mises. \Vhen you decide, circle "L" ior ''logicaP 1 or "NL" for "non-
logical. 11 
EXAi\1PI.E: 
All cats have tails. Kitty is a cat. 
Therefore, Kitty has a tail •••••••••• L NL 
In this,example the conclusion, "Therefore, Kitty hns a tall." does follow 
logically from the premises, uo "L" should be circled. 
LOGICAL ol~ NON-LOGICAL, not TRUE or FALSE 
Some of the pren:dses aro only assumptions for the sn.ke of the proble:m and 
are not tl'·ue in reality. Lll::t."\Vitile, some of the conclusions are not actually truo. 
Do not let this confuse you; as you are to judge whether the conclusion follows 
from tha premises re:;,rardless o1 whether or not they are true .. 
. MEANING OF TERMS 
If you have not thought of it before, you can see that in logic there can be 
only three possible quantifiers: ALL, NONE, and so:r.m. Some means "one or 
more". Terms such as ''many, a fow, frequently, a number of" n.nd so forth, 
are all syno11o:mous with "some". 
SCORING 
Each correct judgment is a point added to your score, and each incorrect 
judgment is a point subtracted from your score, so you shoold NOT guess. An 
o.raission is better than an incot-rect guess, but of course a correct decision is 
bettor than an omission. 
* * * * 
This is a lo.:_;ical rt;..>a.soning te:.>t; you should think. clearly and accurately. 
GO AHEAD ••••• BEGlli NOW. 
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11. If we rearm Germany, the French will oppose us, and if we fall to 
maintaln air bases in East Anglin. we shall incur the resentment of the 
British. But it is essential to retain the good will of either France or 
Britain. Therefore, we r1mst either maintain Anglian air bases or else 
abandon plans for the rearmament of Germany ..••••••••••••••••••••••• 
12. If you don't go by train you will not arrive on time, and if you don't 
travel Pullman you will get no sleep. But you have a berth on the express 
train. Therefore, you will arrive promptly and have a good night'::; sleep 
on the way . ....................................................... .. 
13. No people interestoo in human behavior have failed to read William 
James' book on psychology. No people who have failed to rea~\ James' 
book are psychologists. Therefore, some people interested in human 
behavior are not psychologists ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
14. If tlle average citizen of this country were dishonest, democratic 
government in the U.s. woold be impossible. And if the average citizen 
of this country were not ~~tupid, then U.S. foreign policies would not be 
inconsistent. But in fact, the U.s. has been a democracy since the revol-
ution and its foreign policies have always been inconsistent. Therefore, 
the average citizen of this country is a fool but not a knave .••.•••••••••• 
15. All the houses on this street are unsightly. Eve1-y house built since 
the war is an eyesore. Therefore, some of the houses on this ·s:reet 
L NL 
L NL 
L NL 
L NL 
were built after the war............. . . . . . . . . . . • . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . L I~L 
16. :Most executives are college graduates. The majority of executives are 
Republicans. Therefore, n1ost college graduates are Republicans........ L NL 
17. Only a very conceited person or one of ripe years and wide experience 
would presume to tell others how they should order their private lives. 
Therefore, all family relations counselors are either of ripe years and 
wide e:r.perlence or conceited • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • L NL 
18. No person interested in treating human ailrnents has failed to study 
Prof. Pavlov's boolt on the nature of the digestive system ••. abo-.>k which 
won the Nobel prize. No person who has failed to study Prof. Pavlov's 
book is a physician. Therefore, although they may have other interests, 
it can be said that all physicians aro interested in treating human ailments.. L NL 
19. No pilot with less than ten hours flying time is permitted to fly alone 
without an instructor. Captain .Martin has two thousand hours of flying time. 
Therefore, Capt. Martin is permitted to fly along without an instructor.... L NL 
20. You can fool some of the people all the time. You can fool all of the 
people some of the time. Therefore, you cannot fool all the people all the 
time •••••...•..•..•..•.••.•.•••••.•..•..•••..••.•.••...•••.••.••• LNL 
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Appendix VI 
PERSONAL CORRl!:SPONDENCE from philosopher to present author 
:Mr. l:"red K. :McCoy 
Department of Psychology 
University of Richmond 
Dear Ivlr. 1\'lcCoy: 
University of Virginia 
Corcoran Dept. of Philosophy 
Cabell Hall, Charlottesville, Va. 
28 Jmmary 1960 
I regret that I cannot consider cooperating with yvu in your research concern-
ing logical reasoning ability, as I shall not be teacl<..ing elementary logic during the 
next several semesters. But there are two comments that I might h:ake. 
lu describing your work, you speak as though yrn.; were attempt~ a general 
study of logical reasoning ability; and you seem to suppose that th\.3 Morgan Test 
is a test of general reasoning ability. But this is a bit too pretentious, I think. 
'When we talk of logical reasoning ability we are talldng nbout a whole group of abili-
ties of different though related kinds. Ability in logical reasoning surely embraces 
both ability in contrncting good arguments and ability to rec::>gnize good arguments; 
it surely inV•)lves ability with deductive arguments and ability with inductive argu-
ments. The Morgan Test evi!.lently tests primarily the ability to recognize certain 
types of deductive arguments. Before you would be entitled to claim that the .Morgan 
Test is indeed a way of testing logical reasoning in general, you would first need to 
show that this special ability which it tests is closely correlated with the other kinds 
of abilities that g-o to make up logic:al reasoning. 
You seem to suppose that ii tnking logic courses does not improve students' 
Mor():nn scores, then this shows that logical reasoning ability is''primarily innatett 
or "inherent". But this I think is misleaillng. The ability to reason logically, like 
the ability to speak and write correctly, is a very general sort of ability which a 
student gradunlly builds up ruJ a cumulative result of all his intellectual experiences. 
Students who can not write or spe..·1.k gramruatieally are usually only very slightly im-
proved by a ser:aester's study of English; yet we do not infer from this that grammar 
is an innate capacity. We know that g-ra:mmar is learned, but that tho learning of it 
is slow t painfut, and starts in infancy. So on a ought p~rhaps to beware of basing any 
sweeping conclusions on the observation that a semester of logic leaves many students 
unaffected. 
Your project is an interesting one, and I wish you nll success With it. 
Yours tntly, 
s. F. Barker 
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Appendix Vll 
C.LASSil'"ICATION 01;' ITE:ii!S: Morgnn Test of Logical Reasoning 
1. E?D 
(E) 
••• D Assortical Modus poncns subjective 
2. R7M 
{M} Assertical Modus tollens predicative 
.'.R' 
3. I?T 
~ 
. '· I' Assertical Modus Tollens predlcative 
4. G7M 
___{M) 
:.G Aosertical ~lodus tollens preillcat1ve 
5. A?Y 
®__ 
.·• y Assortical Modus ponens subjective 
6. C:>R 
R?pt 
.'. C 7P' Assertical Gyllogi.sm subjective 
7. N'?H' 
-· 
{H') 
. N' Assertical Modus tollens predicativa . . 
8. D7E' 
D' 
.. E' Assertical 1.Viodus ponens subjective 
J. H?D' 
D 
.·• H Assertical 1Y.i.ojus tollens predicative 
10. C?X 
C' 
• ·vt 
. . .,(}., Propositional ll.lodus Poncns subjective 
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l.L T~~~o• 
s ~-1!'' 
.·.B:::>G' Assertical Syllogism subjective 
12. M;::H 
S 1 :::>M 
• ·.S' :;:oH Assertical Syllogism subjective\ 
13. P 1 7T 
p 
. T' Propositionnl Modus poncn.s subjedive . . 
14. GE7T 
TJY' 
.~. GE_:,yr Aaserticnl Syllogism subjective 
15. U7S 
~· ; • 'J.'fi?B' ansertical Syllogism predicative/St..tbjective 
16. GS7S 
IPGS 
:.S7H Assertical Syllogism predicative 
17. FBI? La 
D?FBI 
:.D ?LA Assertlcal Syllogism subjective 
18. W'?C 
w 
.. c Propositional Modus por.ens subjective 
19. 87\V 
W;J<f' 
:. Y.?S 1 Asaertical Syllogism predicative 
20. A7Q' 
K7A 
-:.K.?l~t Assertlcal Syllogism subjective 
21. S/H 
TV7S 
.~. TJH Propositional Syllogism subjective 
22. C::>ROCC 
C?T' 
.'.T7C Asscrtical Syllogism pn..~cative 
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23. AC:; H' 
1'•1:-JH 
.~M r AC' Assertical Syllogism subj ective/predicati ve 
24. A/F 
F ;P' 
• :A) pt Asaertical Syllogism subjective 
25. G'JS B7R1 
G D' 
. S' , R Assertical Modus ponens subjective •• . . 
26. E 7 D' 
D')PS' 
.... PS7E Assertical Syllogism- predicative 
27. cr·7Ft 
l!., 
·'· c Assertical Modus tollens predicative 
28. 40 7 8 
S' 
• ~40 1 Aasertical Modus tollens predlcative 
29. P?C' 
P' 
r c Asaertical Modus ponens subjective .. 
30. C?E 
E' 
.. c Assertical Modus tollens predicati ve 
31. AF>A' S.:>B' 
A B 
• • • .1\.Ii' I .. S' Propositional Modus tollcns predicative 
32. !?Ad' 
Ad'-='Ag 
.".Ag>L Assertica.l Syllogism subjective 
33. C.?S 
~ 
.·.c 7T' Assertical Syllogism subjective 
34. M/T1 S.?A' 
T A 
.-. r~t' , c:;' • ,u Assertical Modus tollens predicative 
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35. CS.)I 
I 
:.cs Assertical Modus tollena predicative 
36. W7Y' 
y 
.... ; \'!/' Assortical Modus tollens predicative 
37. Pr?Pe' 
F 7Pr 
:. E' ::> Pe' Assertical Syllogism subjective 
ss. Sl> R' Sl17L1 
H' L' 
-.~. Sl .-. Bh Propositional .Modus tollens predicative 
39. r·u 
T 7 I 
:. 'r?U Asaertical Syllogism subjective 
40. T?S 
T' 
--
' 8' Assertical Modus ponens subjective •• 
til. 'JV'B:::>T' 
;-·-,· 
.. 
... 
.-. WB Assertical Modus tollens predicative 
42. G./F 
F' 
-.~ G Propositional Modus tollens predioative 
43. B.?C' 
B70 
::c~Jo Assertical Syllogism predioative/subjective 
44. Slv!.?K 
K ::>I 
.'. sl\1.?1 Assertical Syllogism subjective 
45. M::>NE 
NK:>PF' 
•·• J\'b Pl.<' Assertical Syllogism subjective 
46. B::JS 
§2.L 
; .U71 Assertical Syllogism subjective 
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47. AVJV 
H? AV 
:.V.7 H Assertical Syllogism predicative 
48 • G'JF' AB';:>B' 
...._E. B 
•;• G' ' AD Propositional Modus tollens prcdicative .. 
4S. T7MB 
M ..S:7U 
.-. T::; U Assertical Syllogism subjective 
50. Tr'7Ti' pt::>St 
Tr p 
.. Ti s Propositional Modusponens subjective 
51. 2•!7A 
I' 7 24 
:.I ;; A Assertical Syllogism subjective 
59 
..... B?V/J 
p:>wJ 
:.B:JP' Assertical Syllogism subj octive /prcd.ieative 
53. N?P 
P7A1 
:;.A:>l?" Aasertical Syllogism predicative 
54. D?G' 8 17!1 
G I 
• ·• D' , .("1 Propositional :Modus tollcns predicative •• Q 
55. S?U 
W?U 
-
:.S7W Asscrtical Syllogism subjectlve/predicative 
56. E)G 
E/R 
.·.G.7H As.sertical Syllogism predicative/subj octi ve 
57. P:JC-WE 
p 
.'. C-\.\'E Propositional Modusponena subjective 
58. W:>E 
L'lE 
.'. W :JL' Asscl"tical Syllogism subjective/predicative 
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59. W?H' G'?C' 
H c 
-
• ~ W' .lG Pl·opositional Modus tollens predlcative 
60. G':::;F R'jB' 
g_ n 
. F B Propositional Moo'us ponens subjective . . . . 
61. B?Et c•·_:~H' 
B' C' 
. E H Prepositional .Modus po11ens subjective . . . . 
62. Re' ;?Run' S'?P' 
Run p 
.·.ne :.s Propositional Modus tollcns predicative 
;1 r. 0.:>. LW?C' 
C'-::> ND 
.~LW?ND' Propositional Syllogism subjective 
64. E·7 H 
H7N 
;.N7E Assertical Syllogism predica.tive 
65. VG' S?B' 
_Q_ B 
·'. J1 .--.s Propositional r•10'Jus tollcna predicative 
66. S:>A 
A7M' 
• '• M7S' Asscrtical Syllogism prOOicative 
67. G)C' L 1 ?R' 
__£ R 
: .G' :. L Propositional Modus tollcns predicative 
68. T 1?Pa.v' 
Pav'::::>Ph;E' 
.'. Pby ?'£ Assertlc?..l Syllogism predicative 
69. DJL1 
D' 
·'• L Assortical Modus pon.ena subjective 
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70. D ·-AvB E7AVD 
A"JC c :>J2'; 
A-,D D7B 
B:"'F 
D 1 AvB E"AVD 
D~B A 7 D 
• ~A ~'D • '. &? D 
.·.A :;;C 7E:::>D-;-B 7F Assertical Modus ponens subjective 
71. 1'7N'D 
ND70 
:.17 s Aosertical Syllogism subjective 
72. F?H 
__n 
. r.· 
.. ~ Assertical .r&xlus tollens predicative 
73. B'?P' 
p 
•'• B Assertical l'rlodus tollens predicati ve 
74. T 1/ F' 
T 
.. lf' Assertical :M.odus ponens subjective 
71" o. sP?aT 
aP-, sT 
.'.u.I>7aT' Assertical Syllogism subjective 
vrrA 
Tho author completed :12 tL'1~1orgrnduato hours i:r1 psyclwlog;y at the UnivGrsity 
t)f BiclunO'nd while wcrking full-thnc in a Rich.rnond factor.;~. He graduated .££D.. 
clinlr:u.l psychologist for th•~ E>loliih) Pvychi~tric Cl:hlic in HichJnOJld, worked part-
time ooca..I:'Jional.ly for Psyc,h:::llor.;ic::tl Con.nultants, Inc. oi I'lic!u:iond, coE:plct&J 
In h!Gl he left scimol and ·was an inteUigenco o1J:lcer in the U.S. IH.:1rine 
Corps for a litUc ovc;;r three ye-arn. EoturnL"1[; to school in 1DG,1 ·with a wife and 
throe ym.r {)ld ch1lu he cznnplctecl three rnore hours ar1d w~.n·ked a :;ear nan clLllicnl 
psychologist for the D;::'\PartE~.ont oi Corrections of the Diatl'ict of Columbia. Com-
